At first, Fichte begins, this negation or “nothing” (Nichts) is to be grasped only as a negation of some determination or as a determined nothing that is related to the denied determined quality. Such a denial is found in another positive: every positive is at the same time the denial of another and every denial is itself something positive. The negativity or determined nothing is then, Fichte thinks, one of the most comprehensive categories, since it goes through all qualitative determinations as a hidden moment that taints everything.
Secondly, Fichte continues, the nothing can be understood as a negation of all qualities or as purely undetermined and not-qualitative. This is the most abstract meaning of nothing, which, according to Fichte, characterises all categories before quality, which could be collectively designated as not yet qualitative or nothing. This means, he explains, that these previous categories are contradictory in that they are supposed to be sustained by themselves and still are nothing in themselves, but only as related to something qualitatively determined. Thus, they are not unrelated to quality, but demand and presuppose a qualitative principle that could take them beyond the contradiction of their emptiness. The nothingness in general is, hence, only the most general expression for the contradiction of the lacking dialectical complement, Fichte suggests, and every abstraction sinks constantly to nothing. Indeed, he emphasises, the whole field of categories consists only of forms for reality, but is nothing in itself. Real could then be partly defined as the negation of this mere nothingness of forms, he suggests, but partly it is a positive filling or a creative principle behind these formalities. Thus, Fichte concludes, only in the original reality or in absolute can be found both the principle of this formal nothingness and also its eternal cancellation of nothing.
Thirdly, Fichte states, the nothingness or negativity implies a relation to something else. In other words, what is finite is nothing or negative, because it is only in a negative relation connecting it to something else: finite is finite, because it is otherwise than anything outside it or because it can be distinguished from everything else. Determined nothing, Fichte suggests, can therefore be expressed as distinction or difference (Unterschied), which means qualitative, reciprocal negation of something else or qualitative non-identity. Everything finite is then partly different from others, but partly is itself other to these others. Because this reciprocal negating continues infinitely, Fichte argues, distinction is an infinitely continuing separation and relation of finite entities or infinite negative relativity, and this distinction is the truth of negation or nothing. Thus, Fichte says, in the very concept of finite lies an infinite relation to everything else.
At first, Fichte says, the distinction or difference between the finite entities is just an abstract, simple non-identity (Verschiedenheit): a finite entity just formally differs from everything else, without any regard to its particular content. As Fichte notes, this most abstract or formal distinction is valid everywhere, but it is still a superficial category, just like the categories of abstract determination and negativity. Indeed, the abstract difference unites both abstract determination and abstract negativity as a determination that negates everything else by being distinguished from them. Thus, the relation of difference does hold between all finite entities and therefore continues in infinity. Still, Fichte points out, such an abstract difference remains only at the surface of qualitative distinction, since it does not make explicit how nor how much the finite entities differ.
Abstract difference requires conceptual development, Fichte states, since the different moments related to one another are not just formally different from each other. Similarly, he notes, sameness or similarity expresses also just formally the negation of a distinction between related moments. According to Fichte, difference and sameness are only concepts that can be permuted with one another: same qualities a and b can in one specific regard be similar or same and still also dissimilar or different. The concepts of sameness and difference are just external and completely relative determinations, and the most inessential fact that can be asserted of two things is that they are similar or dissimilar with one another. Such a statement leaves completely undetermined their essential characteristic, and Fichte suggests that superficial comparing of individual things springs from one-sided application of the formal sameness and difference.
Mere difference therefore becomes opposition, Fichte insists. In other words, every determined entity is not just formally distinguished from something else, but this other has also a different determination: what a is, it is only in negative relation to b and vice versa, or both are opposed to one another. True distinction consists thus only in reciprocal negative relation to one another. The opposition, Fichte argues, is therefore never simple, but has in itself the double aspect that each side of the opposition can be only negatively toward what the other is positively and both are thinkable only in relation to one another and not as isolated moments or indifferent to one another.
The third moment of distinction after abstract difference and opposition, Fichte states, is specific difference. This means that something qualitative receives its own determination only in internal opposition to other determinations. Hence, Fichte thinks, qualitative determination is not just dissimilar to other determinations, but it is posited as this qualitative determination only through its opposition to others. Reciprocal negation of qualitative determinations therefore is not just external exclusion, but also their reciprocal positing in their mutual opposition, that is, each determination receives its own character only from its relation to other determinations. Abstract opposition has thus become a specific, self-determining distinction, which should be the truth of all previous categories of negation. Determinations are therefore to be thought as specific differences against others, that is, in both negative and positive relation to them within a system of related distinctions, all of which assert their character at this determined place in relation to others.
All determination is thus inseparable from the concept of specific difference, which completely removes the notion that there could be any isolated finite determination, Fichte insists. Instead, finite determinations need a system of qualities mutually bounding and thus determining each other. Fichte adds that the specific difference is not just the truth of negative categories, but has also a positive meaning, since it produces the positive side of negation, just like earlier positive determination transformed into a negative characteristic. Here both the opposite sides are at first fully united, he thinks, and the negative-positive character of each determination in a system of qualities is emphasised. Fichte makes the comparison that just like in the sphere of quantity the abstract relation of magnitudes became a determined and therefore specific magnitude, the concept of quality has finally developed itself into a specific difference within a system of qualities.
The negative relation between entities developed into a specific difference, Fichte continues, and now it will turn back to each of these finite entities. In other words, the character of otherness is common to all of the finite entities, and they resemble each other by being completely governed by it and only through otherness their similarity should be reproduced. This means, Fichte insists, that a finite entity is not other just outwardly or in relation to something else, but also toward itself: it is now this, but can also become something else.
We have thus arrived at a new concept of change or becoming. Fichte points out that what he refers to as becoming (Werden) is not the unity of being and nothing, like in Hegelian philosophy, but refers to the more developed thought of a transition from something to something else or other. In this becoming, something changes, but also remains the same, thus, Fichte suggests, what becomes should also be thought as not becoming, but being unchangeably. Becoming or changing therefore immediately combines the opposed and formally contradicting moments of sameness and distinction. Without similarity, the becoming would shatter into absolutely separated and external opposites and would not anymore be becoming. Furthermore, without true change between different moments, we would have just a rigid lack of movement that would not even be a unity, but just the former abstraction of empty something.
The becoming, defined as the formal identity of opposed moments of unity and non-unity or similarity and non-similarity, Fichte states, seems to be a contradictory concept. Even more, he adds, it is the highest expression of contradiction in the categories of negation. The contradiction in general, according to Fichte, is a form of negation and should thus be handled here. Earlier we found apparently contradictory insights that the positive carries in itself also the opposite or negation and that the determination is in another context the nothing. Now, the contradiction seems greatest in the concept of becoming, which as the formal identity of similarity and non-similarity is itself the absolute contradiction. Thus, Fichte argues, contradiction must be meaningful, even if not in the concrete actuality, still at least in the ontological consideration of pure concepts.
The fundamental proposition of contradiction, Fichte reminds the reader, asserts the absolute non-actuality of contradictions: contradictory cannot exist. He asserts that contradictory should not be defined as the unthinkable, since in order that we can assert it as not thinkable, it must be actually thought. Instead, Fichte makes the correction, contradictory as self-cancelling should not be thought as actual, because the self-cancellation is precisely the denial of actuality. Showing contradiction in our thoughts can mean two things, Fichte adds. Firstly, the contradictory might lack a moment that is necessary for its actuality and then its concept is not perfect and therefore also not actual: this he calls formal contradiction. Secondly. it could contain a moment that does not allow the actuality of the asserted concept, that is, positively cancels it: this he calls material contradiction.
If we stop at the general result that the contradiction in the formal or material sense designates in general a non-being, Fichte suggests, the ontology has to exclusively do with contradictions of the formal kind, since such a formal contradiction points to the lack of moments that are necessary for existence of something. The nearest solution of this ontological contradiction is then adding what is lacking and continuing to search for these necessary complements, until the contradiction is resolved and the concept is complete and able to be actual. Fichte suggests that this resolving of contradiction, which he has earlier called the negative dialectics, goes through the whole ontology, since every subordinate category can be brought to contradiction, because they require being complemented through the following concept. Indeed, he adds, even more generally the whole world of categories falls prey to contradiction, because it cannot be actual in itself, but only in the reality complementing it. This means, Fichte thinks, that contradictions have only ontological and not real validity, which gives ontology its characteristic position that it has to transition into a speculative discipline that will give ontology its truth. Ontology itself does not yet fully resolve contradictions insofar as its categories and concepts as a whole are tainted with self-negation, which makes it necessary to complement them through actuality.
Returning to the notion of pure becoming, Fichte notes that it is one of those contradictory concepts and even the most contradictory of all that we have seen thus far, since the opposition of position and negation condenses here to its sharpest expression. Its contradiction means just that pure becoming must be denied any actuality, that is, we still require other ontological and real moments, in order to be able to think what is becoming as actual. It is the task of ontology to find the ontological conditions for this, Fichte explains, and it is the task of the gradual process through the following categories to perfect this concept ontologically. At the same time, he adds, ontology also demonstrates negatively which real moments the becoming still lacks and what therefore still remains for real philosophy to do, in order that we can think this concept as actual.
Changeability means continuing self-negation or transition from one moment to another, thus, Fichte argues, it splinters into opposed moments of generation (Entstehen) and destruction (Vergehen) or beginning and end. He immediately adds that the isolated opposition of these two concepts is one-sided and untrue: beginning is already end and generation is also destruction. In other words, we can distinguish beginning and end only by arbitrarily separating one moment in the flow of unbounded becoming, where this isolated moment can be regarded as the end of the previous moments, just as well as the beginning for the following. Generation or beginning is a completely relative concept, Fichte suggests, or there is no absolute beginning in the continuity of becoming that always remains the same. Similarly destruction or end breaks the series of becoming, but this break just transitions to something new and the supposed end is actually a beginning.
The separation of the beginning by itself and the end by itself is untrue and one-sided, Fichte insists: same moment of change is both a beginning to what appears from it and an end to what lies behind it. He notes that it has been one of the easiest and one of the earliest known ontological propositions that generation and destruction, abstractly understood, belong only to what seems. In other words, ontologically regarded nothing is generated and nothing is destroyed, but something continually becomes something else. Then again, Fichte adds, each determined entity is just a finite moment of this infinite becoming and these finite moments are both generated and destroyed. Thus, he concludes, we must join the two, each other complementing propositions – nothing is truly generated and nothing is truly destroyed – with the third proposition that everything determined is both generated and destroyed.
The changeability flows out into an endless series of individual moments of varying determinations. Fichte notes that this endless series corresponds with what Hegel called the bad infinity, although Fichte suggests calling it the external infinity. What is properly true and remains the same in this changeability, he adds, is the omnipresent, infinite relation of all these individual moments to one another. Every finite individual from the series of becoming is driven over their isolation to a positive relation with everything else. Such an individual is not just negatively related to the others, Fichte explains, as happened in the earlier relation of infinite otherness. Instead, the becoming of a moment from and to other moments makes their interrelation more positive, and Fichte calls this positive mutual bounding of the finite entities limitation.
The becoming, defined as the formal identity of opposed moments of unity and non-unity or similarity and non-similarity, Fichte states, seems to be a contradictory concept. Even more, he adds, it is the highest expression of contradiction in the categories of negation. The contradiction in general, according to Fichte, is a form of negation and should thus be handled here. Earlier we found apparently contradictory insights that the positive carries in itself also the opposite or negation and that the determination is in another context the nothing. Now, the contradiction seems greatest in the concept of becoming, which as the formal identity of similarity and non-similarity is itself the absolute contradiction. Thus, Fichte argues, contradiction must be meaningful, even if not in the concrete actuality, still at least in the ontological consideration of pure concepts.
The fundamental proposition of contradiction, Fichte reminds the reader, asserts the absolute non-actuality of contradictions: contradictory cannot exist. He asserts that contradictory should not be defined as the unthinkable, since in order that we can assert it as not thinkable, it must be actually thought. Instead, Fichte makes the correction, contradictory as self-cancelling should not be thought as actual, because the self-cancellation is precisely the denial of actuality. Showing contradiction in our thoughts can mean two things, Fichte adds. Firstly, the contradictory might lack a moment that is necessary for its actuality and then its concept is not perfect and therefore also not actual: this he calls formal contradiction. Secondly. it could contain a moment that does not allow the actuality of the asserted concept, that is, positively cancels it: this he calls material contradiction.
If we stop at the general result that the contradiction in the formal or material sense designates in general a non-being, Fichte suggests, the ontology has to exclusively do with contradictions of the formal kind, since such a formal contradiction points to the lack of moments that are necessary for existence of something. The nearest solution of this ontological contradiction is then adding what is lacking and continuing to search for these necessary complements, until the contradiction is resolved and the concept is complete and able to be actual. Fichte suggests that this resolving of contradiction, which he has earlier called the negative dialectics, goes through the whole ontology, since every subordinate category can be brought to contradiction, because they require being complemented through the following concept. Indeed, he adds, even more generally the whole world of categories falls prey to contradiction, because it cannot be actual in itself, but only in the reality complementing it. This means, Fichte thinks, that contradictions have only ontological and not real validity, which gives ontology its characteristic position that it has to transition into a speculative discipline that will give ontology its truth. Ontology itself does not yet fully resolve contradictions insofar as its categories and concepts as a whole are tainted with self-negation, which makes it necessary to complement them through actuality.
Returning to the notion of pure becoming, Fichte notes that it is one of those contradictory concepts and even the most contradictory of all that we have seen thus far, since the opposition of position and negation condenses here to its sharpest expression. Its contradiction means just that pure becoming must be denied any actuality, that is, we still require other ontological and real moments, in order to be able to think what is becoming as actual. It is the task of ontology to find the ontological conditions for this, Fichte explains, and it is the task of the gradual process through the following categories to perfect this concept ontologically. At the same time, he adds, ontology also demonstrates negatively which real moments the becoming still lacks and what therefore still remains for real philosophy to do, in order that we can think this concept as actual.
Changeability means continuing self-negation or transition from one moment to another, thus, Fichte argues, it splinters into opposed moments of generation (Entstehen) and destruction (Vergehen) or beginning and end. He immediately adds that the isolated opposition of these two concepts is one-sided and untrue: beginning is already end and generation is also destruction. In other words, we can distinguish beginning and end only by arbitrarily separating one moment in the flow of unbounded becoming, where this isolated moment can be regarded as the end of the previous moments, just as well as the beginning for the following. Generation or beginning is a completely relative concept, Fichte suggests, or there is no absolute beginning in the continuity of becoming that always remains the same. Similarly destruction or end breaks the series of becoming, but this break just transitions to something new and the supposed end is actually a beginning.
The separation of the beginning by itself and the end by itself is untrue and one-sided, Fichte insists: same moment of change is both a beginning to what appears from it and an end to what lies behind it. He notes that it has been one of the easiest and one of the earliest known ontological propositions that generation and destruction, abstractly understood, belong only to what seems. In other words, ontologically regarded nothing is generated and nothing is destroyed, but something continually becomes something else. Then again, Fichte adds, each determined entity is just a finite moment of this infinite becoming and these finite moments are both generated and destroyed. Thus, he concludes, we must join the two, each other complementing propositions – nothing is truly generated and nothing is truly destroyed – with the third proposition that everything determined is both generated and destroyed.
The changeability flows out into an endless series of individual moments of varying determinations. Fichte notes that this endless series corresponds with what Hegel called the bad infinity, although Fichte suggests calling it the external infinity. What is properly true and remains the same in this changeability, he adds, is the omnipresent, infinite relation of all these individual moments to one another. Every finite individual from the series of becoming is driven over their isolation to a positive relation with everything else. Such an individual is not just negatively related to the others, Fichte explains, as happened in the earlier relation of infinite otherness. Instead, the becoming of a moment from and to other moments makes their interrelation more positive, and Fichte calls this positive mutual bounding of the finite entities limitation.
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