Fichte’s set of categories consist of many pronouns. He began with something (Etwas), then noted it was this (Dieses) distinguished from others, and while at first this distinction seemed just quantitative, now something has been revealed as internally determined or such (Solches), which is opposed to others that are not similarly determined (not-such). Fichte summarises this development with the rather bad German pun that Et-was must be Was, in other words, we have to be able to say of any something what it is. In other words, the formerly quantitative distinction has been shown to be qualitative. Just like quantity was the first of the proper categories, Fichte suggests, quality is its essential complement and therefore necessarily the second in the series of categories. This means, he adds, that individual stages of quality complement the individual determinations of quantity. Unlike quantity, Fichte explains, quality is a source of a true and not merely formal distinction between something and something else. As signifying what something is, he adds, quality is to be still separated from the notion of reality or actuality: even if we know how something would be determined, we still do not know whether such something exists.
Just like at the beginning of the stage of quantity, Fichte considers how the new notion could be used in defining the absolute. From the standpoint of quality, he suggests, this means that the absolute or God comprehends in itself all possible determinations of content or realities, as they were traditionally called, and could thus be called the most real being that also grants to each existent its determined quality. In the case of quantities, absolute grants all beings their quantitative measures, but has no particular quantity itself. Similarly, Fichte thinks, absolute can be ascribed no individual quality, just because it comprehends all qualities in itself. Indeed, the absolute should be purely indifferent and without any properties, and thus the concept of most real being turns into an empty negation. This does not reveal just how abstract and unsatisfying for determining the absolute these first categories are, Fichte says, but also more importantly it shows that all determinations, even in God, are inseparable from negation: absolute or God cannot be just the most universal being, but it must also be a completely determined individual. If we only look at the first viewpoint of universality, he notes, nothing is said about God when they are called the most real being, but this concept can have a positive meaning, when understood as a creative source of qualitative oppositions.
The first stage of quality, Fichte begins, is position: a simple, in itself determined quality. In order to grasp this first stage in its abstraction, he says, all further relations to others should be ignored, and these relations should then be developed from this simple beginning. Fichte reminds us that categories of quality should complement those of quantity, thus, position should correspond to the category of magnitude as both are the starting points of their own series. Hence, he suggests, position could also be designated as qualitative magnitude, which really means nothing else than that the further relations of this qualitative position must be set aside.
Position is thus at first a mere simple quality or determination (Bestimmtheit) without any further relation, or if it is related to something else, Fichte adds, this is seen as something external and contingent. This determination is therefore an affirmation (thesis) of a completely simple and unrelated quality. Fichte calls it one of the poorest categories, because it is only a transitional moment for future concepts. All distinctions and especially all quantitative limitations or magnitudes have been cancelled, as this pure, abstract quality should be still just the direct negation of the previous level: it is the qualitative one or atom of Herbartian philosophy. Furthermore, Fichte continues, the concept of simple determination corresponds also formally with the concept of identity: what is completely determined is similar only to itself. This category could then be stated in the form of an isolated proposition: A = A or the fundamental proposition of identity. Fichte notes that just like the category of simple determination, the proposition of identity is only one-sided and immediately connected to the opposing proposition of contradiction.
A determination can remain simple, Fichte insists, only because it is immediately distinguished from everything else. In other words, just like quantitative one was only in relation to other ones, so a qualitatively determined one is such, because it is externally related to otherwise determined ones: quality of one is its own characteristic (Beschaffenheit). This characteristic, Fichte explains, means otherwise the same as determination, but with the added consciousness that in the determination lies a moment of being distinguished from others. The simple determination is thus at least externally driven outside itself, at least to being beside others with different characteristics.
The simple determination or characteristic becomes qualitative restriction, Fichte insists: we have a series of characteristics or qualities, each of which acts as a boundary to others. Furthermore, he adds, only this qualitative restriction can make anything determined or characterised, thus, the determinations are qualitatively restricted or finite. The concept of finiteness brings forth even more the negative side of determinations. Indeed, finite is only negatively related to anything else that is also finite or they exclude one another in complete isolation, Fichte suggests. Therefore, from the standpoint of the other finite ones the first finite one simply would not be – or at least it would be something else.
Finite asserts itself or sets up boundaries against others, but these boundaries are immediately cancelled, because they are not recognised by the other finite beings. The concept of finite implies thus also its own self-negation, Fichte suggests, and the finite contains an implicit connection to not-finite. Finite and non-finite or infinite are at first only opposed moments that exclude one another: finite is such that cannot be raised to infinity, while the infinite cancels the finite. In this sense, Fichte thinks, finite is the internal boundary of quality, which appears to be governed by something else that turns the finite into its own opposite or lets alteration devour the finite from within: determinations appear, but they also vanish. Finite is thus something contradictory, since while it seems to assert itself, it also negates itself.
The concept of finite with its relation to infinite points to a further progression that should solve the fundamental contradiction involved with finite, Fichte continues. Finite disappears, only to lead into an endless series of further finite beings. This notion of endless seems the only infinite we have here, although Fichte identifies it with what Hegel called mere negative infinity: the finite ones vanish in this endless and infinite abyss, and thus infinite appears as a blind fate that allows everything to be both generated and destroyed. Instead of this negative infinity, Fichte insists, the proper truth of the previous developments is the concept of negation. What is finite goes beyond itself just because it is seemingly isolated and thus negated by the others. The finite ones are thus not just externally related to one another, but they are in a state of reciprocal negation, which is the following stage of quality.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti