The latest result of Fichte’s ontological studies has been the concept of limitation, by which he means a positive quality that appears only through negation, that is, in opposition to all other qualities that it complements. Thus, he thinks, all finite entities should limit one another and so determine their characteristics: they maintain themselves precisely through this mutual negating and by being absolutely inseparable from others. In this category, Fichte thinks, converge all the previous concepts that are summarised in it in a new and higher manner. Thus, all synthesis should have its proper truth in the limitation: everything determined is only in such a way that it is connected to infinity of others and thus asserts itself with a completely particular characteristic belonging only to it. All isolation, Fichte suggests, is simply cancelled and everything antithetical is in general resolved into synthesis, and even further, the synthesis itself is infinitely unifying: everything is absolutely linked with everything else.
The conceptual level of limitation, Fichte thinks, should correspond to both position and negation. Thus, the beginning of limitation should somehow combine in itself both the determination (the beginning of position) and nothing or negativity (the beginning of negation). In other words, Fichte concludes, we should begin with a determination tainted with the negation of something else, which means, according to him, just a relation to this something else or other. The relation to others, he suggests, as the first and most immediate expression of the concept of limitation, means that everything is generally able to be determined by others. In other words, nothing is without any relation or nothing is isolated, and since it is determined or quantitatively and qualitatively limited, it is also open for receiving influences from others, but also has influence on these others. This concept, Fichte suggests, is the truth of both distinction and change, which could be thought as holding between absolutely isolated entities, while here we expressly understand that these entities are mutually determinable.
Relation to something else, Fichte argues, is the most comprehensive concept for the finite in general. Finite entities are in their determination still completely dependent and only moments for something else, thus, being for another or being determinable is the essential meaning of finite. Indeed, Fichte emphasises, this relation to something else is not accidental to the finite, that is, finite cannot fail to have it, but the quantitative and qualitative limit of the finite determination and therefore its fundamental character consists in being in its own being also only for something else.
The relation to something else means, firstly, Fichte suggests, the negation of the exclusive isolation of finite in general: finite is only for another. This concept of “for another”, he thinks, is here regarded abstractly, ignoring all the following categories complementing it. Then the finite exists only for another, but is nothing in itself and thus becomes only what seems to be for this other. The other, Fichte argues, must thus be called the true being or the thing in itself, while the existence of the finite is possible only by assuming a consciousness representing it. This idealistic insight could mean, he suggests, that the finite entities are real only in divine spirit, so that the creation of the world would be only a divine self-representation and perhaps also a partial representation of individual spirits. Fichte thinks that this theory is partially – but only partially – true, because it understands the notion of creation through the notion of divine consciousness. A second manner to understand the idealistic insight, Fichte continues, is that the concept of finity is limited only to natural things, while the spirits should be eternal and substantial realities: here, the sense world would be just delusion. Yet, both ways to grasp the idealistic insight, and indeed, all forms of idealism, Fichte insists, suffer from the mistake that they understand the concept of relation to others in an isolated fashion, ignoring the relative independence of the finite entities. Then again, what is true in them, according to Fichte, is the idealism of finite, according to which anything finite can exist only by letting the other shine through or realise itself in this finite.
Secondly, Fichte assures us, the concept of being for another retains also the positive meaning that in this outward limitation the finite also manages to confirm its own internal determination: the finite is related to or for itself or asserts itself. This does not mean that the relation to other would be completely unrelated, but instead, that this being creates its power to exist from its conflict with others. This self-relation or being for itself is therefore the same as the simple position, Fichte notes, but only unified with a relation to others that it complements. Self-assertion of something continuously reappears from threats to its independence that make it into a living activity.
The category of being for itself, in Fichte’s opinion, is the centre for all categories of quality. Just like simple determination changed into negative and just like from negativity appeared the absolute limited relation of everything to everything, all of these categories have now been collected in their proper result or in the infinitely self-reproducing assertion. Positive is not anymore just an abstraction without relation, but determined only in infinite relation to others. Furthermore, this relation is not external or quantitative, but internal reciprocal determinability. Finally, positive is not just a result of externally arriving determinations and nothing else, but it posits these determinations as appropriated and governed by itself. In conclusion, Fichte states that precisely by facing the infinite negation from others, the determined being receives its positive character, asserting permanently its place in the system of these negations.
The categories of relation to another and of self-assertion, Fichte continues, are now immediately combined: relation to another is the source of self-assertion, and the self-assertion again leads to infinite relation of everything to everything. This combination, he suggests, moves to a mediating unity of a position that is limited by an infinity of othera or asserts itself in infinity of reciprocal relations. According to Fichte, this synthetic concept of limitation is a new category of internal infinity that is distinct from the earlier externally endless process into infinity.
Fichte distinguishes within this internal infinity three moments. Firstly, every determined or finite being is in its self-assertion also for an infinitely other. In other words, each of the determined entities maintains itself against an infinity of others, while it also itself influences this infinity. Thus, both the self-assertion and the relation to others contain an infinity of moments that could be called the external side of the internal infinity. Fichte sees here embodied the proposition that every individual part of the universe is in connection with all others, being open to their influence and influencing them in turn. He notes that later we will see that the individual things are not externally connected into this system of reciprocal influence, but they themselves are derived from this infinity.
The second moment that Fichte emphasises is that every finite being contains this infinity in itself ideally: each is the middle point of infinite radii converging in it. He points out that this notion of internal infinity was already expressed in the Leibnizian idea that a monad reflects in itself the whole universe. Furthermore, Fichte recognises this notion also in the early Schellingian philosophy, which asserted the presence of an actual infinity or reason in the most individual and smallest details of the world. Fichte also thinks that if this thought would have been dialectically developed to its proper conclusion, it would have led to the insight that this absolute reason can only be an absolute spirit or the highest personality.
The second moment unites infinity immediately with determination that arises from its relation to a system of infinite determinations related to each other. Thus, Fichte suggests, the concepts of relation to another and self-assertion are fully balanced: in asserting itself, an individual retains and asserts also its other, and conversely, the infinite system of relations simply ascertains the self-assertion of each individual. Each determinate individual points, according to Fichte, over itself to an infinitely creative, but also ordering and harmonising power.
This creative and harmonising power is, for Fichte, the third and highest moment in the concept of infinity. The finite determinations can be thought only as comprehended in the infinite that always surpasses them by having more finite entities to be related to each other. Here we find again a case of external infinity, and Fichte admits it is a necessary part of this concept, but only as regulated by the internal infinity. Indeed, he insists, this externally infinite system can only exist through a positive comprehension or relating of finite to an infinity of others, whereby the finite is both destroyed and also retained.
Fichte takes this infinity that actively creates and relates finite entities as the first proper definition of absolute. It contains, in Fichte’s opinion, the previous definitions that the absolute is quantifying and qualifying, and the unity of these previous definitions is precisely the concept of an infinite, qualitatively determining and also qualities relating power. This absolute negates the finite, but also posits it at the same time. Thus, Fichte emphasises, although finite both is necessarily opposed to others and also itself becomes something else, in addition, the finite is also affirmed through the infinite or absolute. In other words, the finite has as its basis a determined original quality going through all its facets, which is provided by the absolute in inserting this finite into the system of reciprocally related determinations. This original quality remains one and the same both in being related to others and in becoming itself something else.
Fichte considers the just developed principle of an infinite qualification by the infinite absolute as the mediation of all previous categories and thus as the true internal infinite. The absolute creates infinitely many finite original positions and orders them into a system of reciprocally complementing, but therefore itself changing relations that assert themselves as essential and as necessary members of this reciprocal system. Earlier, Fichte reminds us, these original positions were called finite, but this has now been shown to be only a negative designation. Finite is to be recognised as finite, that is, as negative, he states, only in regard to its external distinctions and changes. Yet, both distinction and change just require complementing from the positive relation and the self-assertion. From an absolute or positive viewpoint, Fichte states, finite is infinite, firstly, because infinity of positive relations converge in it, and secondly, because even in becoming something else it still always remains the same. Fichte calls this the true or positive finity, because as positive it carries in itself also the moment of infinity.
Fichte thinks that the concept of positive finity fills a gap in the category of becoming or change. It solves a contradiction that pure becoming involved both an identity remaining same and an otherness distinguished from itself. The positive, unchangeable original determination, Fichte states, is the principle of unity that remains the same throughout the changing relations to other determinations and that still changes its characteristics and so involves also the opposed principle of changeability. This unity combines the otherwise separated moments of otherness into becoming, so that what does not otherwise become can in another sense become (Fichte thinks that Hegel’s notion of becoming lacks this unity and is thus the most contradictory of all concepts).
Fichte suggests that we have found the correct and the highest mediation between the infinite and finite. Finite is not anymore the merely negative or eternally disappearing moment in infinite, which would make infinite into a mere formal or negative process of such eternally posited and eternally disappearing moments. This negative process is, according to Fichte, the high point of Hegelian philosophy that does not expressly recognise the principle of an infinite qualification in finite. Speaking against Hegel, Fichte insists that the absolute should be the creator of infinite original positions that it also orders into a system of relations. In other words, the absolute posits a finite as originally determined against others, but also again cancels its mere finity and sustains it as enduring in change.
Fichte calls this process the truthful unity of infinite and finite, which is not just a formal unity, where the opposites would be balanced only dialectically. Instead, the infinite is the real, all fulfilling presence in finite, and the unity of both has appeared from the notion of the infinity of finite itself, since negating the finite negates only its negative side. Thus, Fichte says, the finite is not just endlessly vanishing, but an image of infinite. He explicitly opposes Hegel’s negative philosophy, according to which there is nothing finite, in which does not lie a contradiction that cancels it. In opposition to this standpoint, Fichte insists that contradiction or negativity means only one-sided formality, while the finite and limitation is internally infinite, since it is positive, original determination and not tainted with the contradiction, but sustained by the divine harmony and unity.
In these final concepts, Fichte thinks, the mediation of thesis and antithesis has found a completely new and higher expression. Earlier it might have seemed, he explains, as if the synthesis resulted only from a combination of the previous members, but here the case is completely opposite: the synthesis is the most original, creative and comprehensive, through which and in which the opposites only exist. Thus, the synthesis is the absolute that creates the opposites and relates them to one another, and here particularly it creates and orders the infinity of original positions. This opens up for us a new field of investigation, Fichte suggests. Earlier we were involved only with simple concepts that did change into one another and were related, but only in an external manner. Here, on the other hand, for the first time the concept is duplicated in itself into a higher or comprehensive and a lower or comprehended member. Thus, Fichte gives an example, the finite is only in the infinite that is a power positing and governing it. He suggests calling the relation between infinite and finite the original or absolute relation, since all further relations will be only further development of it.
The first part of ontology has thus led into a second part investigating relational concepts. Fichte considers this transition important, because it moves ontology from mere preliminary concepts to the proper task of speculation. Thus, the earlier fundamental determinations of absolute were always in opposition to predicates of finite, and it meant unmistakably a conflict between both conceptual spheres, if we designated the absolute as being without quantity, but also as quantifying everything, as indifference, but also as comprehending all finite differences or as identity, but as governing all finite distinctions. Fichte notes that it was earlier a problem how these two sides of the absolute could be combined, but it had to be passed over, because it could only be dealt in the sphere of relational concepts. The earlier definitions were then only provisional and elementary, while here, on the other hand, the principle of distinction has been found in the absolute itself: the second member or the created, finite world has appeared from it, which expresses the original relation of absolute to itself that the ontology tries to establish.
Before moving to this new field of investigation, Fichte summarises the first part. The task of ontology was to solve the question what actuality means or what are its universally valid forms. We began with the Ur-categories, which showed a paradigmatic structure for all categories: a thesis is possible only in relation to antithesis and both are comprehended in a synthesis as the true, perfect form of actuality, while thesis and antithesis are only its moments, parts or members, without any truth or meaning by themselves. Thus, everything actual was revealed to be a this (Dieses), absolutely mediating these oppositions, but because it was at first just empty this, it could be determined only quantitatively. Quantity was hence the first category or the most abstract form of actuality, with no particular content, but expressly grasped as an independent concept. The further divisions of quantity – number, measure and grade – were only in relation to other quantities, which led to the synthesis of all comprehending quantitative infinity: every number, every measure and every grade existed only in a system of infinite mutually determining quantitative relations.
The whole level of quantity refuted itself, Fichte continues summarising, and quantity was revealed to be a mere form of a quality. This simply qualified determination is the finite, which again was positive only antithetically or in opposition to another and in changing its characteristics to something else. Thus, this position inevitably had a negative side both in distinctions and in changeability. Although seemingly threatened with annihilation, it still maintained itself through a true synthetical relation, where the finite is grasped as really positive or as internal infinity, which in change appeared as the presence of a stable reality. These negative concepts are thus completed by a mutually affirming relation, and from this positing of limited original positions appeared as the highest result in this circle of categories the concept of truly creative infinite or absolute, in which and through which alone the finite is.
The concept of finite proves its own dependence in all instances, Fichte states, and it finds its truth only when raised in the synthetical unity. Thetic this, limited quantity and qualitative determination have all refuted themselves in isolation, but at the same time they have also refuted the negation or antithesis of their own levels. Present in everything, Fichte concludes, is the positively filling and also infinitely relating absolute, and the former categories have all appeared as mere forms of actualisation of the absolute. Thus, when the finite is thought in isolation or when someone wants to isolate it, it remains contradictory in the true sense of the word, but this attempt to isolate refutes itself: the finite is not at all by itself, but only in absolute.
It is thus possible to distinguish two results in the first part, Fichte suggests. Firstly, concerning the formal side, at all stages we have advanced from abstract to concrete, and every individual conceptual moment has been more concretely determined than the previous one. The beginning or something was the emptiest notion, Fichte reminds us, and we have raised ourselves to the concept of absolute, which is not just the most concrete concept possible in this sphere of ontology, but in general the principle of everything concrete. Secondly, concerning the content, the performed synthesis, that is, the complete thinking of all antithetical relations has refuted all the forms of finite (thesis-antithesis) and shown them as mere moments of infinite that actualises itself in them. The original synthesis or the absolute has appeared from all these opposites as the only true and actual, but also infinite being, which according to thus far investigated forms of actuality could even be called both quantitatively and qualitatively infinite. This absolute is not just a formal, empty actuality, which would make it again just a quantity, Fichte insists, because everything merely formal has always refuted itself. Instead, the absolute has appeared as a principle of reality that, on the one hand, is beyond the confines of ontology, but on the other hand, has forms that can be fully investigated by the ontology and that are in essential parts already known, although how or as what absolute actualises itself remains completely inaccessible to ontology.
Fichte states that he has already provisionally confirmed the basic characteristic of his ontology that it considers an absolute, which in itself is not merely formal, only in regard to its forms. Indeed, he thinks to have shown that in the self-realising act of the absolute is to be found the principle of these forms. This leads us to a higher concept of absolute as infinitely self-realising and self-forming: absolute is not anymore just a lifeless infinite being, but a living, creative unity that gives itself both infinite form and actuality. This completely new concept can be designated at first and in most general manner only as essence, which means defining the absolute as the infinite essence.
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