sunnuntai 15. marraskuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – Causal explanations

After the more logical problems, Bolzano turns to the more substantial question of whether a truth is a fundamental truth based on nothing else or a consequence of some more fundamental truth or ground, and in the latter, what this ground is. Bolzano really has not much to say about this task, but suggests that we should analyse the truth into its constituents and then try to use these constituents to construct simpler truths that might be the ground of this truth.

A special case of the general problem of finding grounds is that of finding causes for the existence or occurrence of something. Bolzano notes that the causes are not substances as such, but forces adhering to some substance, generating that which they cause either over a finite time or in no time at all. The latter is a characteristic of only the divine power of creation, about which, Bolzano thinks, logic can really say nothing further, since it is the task of metaphysics to prove its existence conceptually. On the other hand, he adds, the former kind of cause cannot be proven to exist conceptually, because it exists at a definite time.

When we want to determine a cause of something, Bolzano continues, we want to give characteristics that distinguish the cause from other things. He notes that some of these characteristics we can derive conceptually, for instance, when we regard the action of a rational person, we can infer that their action must have had a purpose. Since deriving such conceptual properties is again more of a metaphysical question, Bolzano moves on to consider the characteristics of cause revealed only through perceptions, either as immediately instigating them or as affecting other things to instigate the perceptions.

Bolzano notes that we might be looking for a cause of a single, definite phenomenon or then a general type of phenomena. In the former case, he begins, we might say that all things interact and thus everything is a cause of everything else, but from human perspective it is usually possible to concentrate only on some prominent causes (of course, what is seen as a cause can depend on one’s perspective). Indeed, Bolzano says, the only way we can answer such a question is to say that an object of this kind is generally caused by a force of a particular kind, which turns the first type of question into the second type.

The finding of general types of causes, Bolzano continues, should work simply by seeing another type of phenomenon – or in many cases, a set of alternative phenomena – accompany the kind of event that requires explanation. He admits that this is not an easy task and suggests several tricks for simplifying the investigations, such as the common increase and decrease of different quantities (e.g. atmosphere warming when there’s more sunlight) and use of analogies. In any case, all these causal inferences rely on probabilities and are prone to errors, such as taking as full cause what is only a partial cause.

Sometimes we are not looking for a cause, but we are given one and we are meant to test whether this explanation is correct or at least probable. Bolzano notes that we should for the very first check if the suggested explanation contradicts some known truth completely or with a high degree of improbability, and if they happen to contradict a conceptual truth, they presuppose something impossible. He adds that if we have ascertained that the explanation is not contradicted by other truths, we should also determine that it is not too self-evident. Between impossible and self-evident lies then the large number of propositions which still require that we check their grounds and their believability (note that failing to find proper grounds does not mean that the proposition would be automatically false).

Bolzano notes that we can also try to search the effects for given causes, not just the other way around, but this change of directions does not bring anything truly new to the table. A more interesting modification is the subspecies of finding means for giving purposes. Of course, before even starting the process of finding the solution, Bolzano notes, we should check if it is impossible to actualise the given purpose or whether it is, on the contrary, futile, because the required purpose is trivial to produce. If the given purpose is not impossible nor trivial, Bolzano concludes, we should make analysis about different causal factors required for actualising it.

Another special case of finding causes is that of finding out judgements of rational entities – it is a special case, because a judgement, Bolzano explains, can be a cause of e.g. actions of human beings. The crucial evidence, he adds, comes from learning the mindset of the maker of the judgement, revealed not just by their spoken or written texts, but also by their actions, reactions and even emotional outbursts. Bolzano notes that no general rules for this task can really be given, especially as people have the ability to deceive us about what they are thinking

A further type of cause, especially of actions of rational beings, Bolzano continues forward, consists of purposes, which he defines as expected results of action that determine the will to do something. He points out that the definition applies also in cases where the entity that has the purpose is not conscious of having such a purpose – this is something even animals are capable of.

Although we could find out the purposes that individuals have for their actions, Bolzano states, we still might not be able to say whether the sum of all the actions of all the individuals might also have a purpose. This would require, he notes, that there is at least a single being that has wanted this sum of actions to be actualised and has the power to instigate others to the required activities. Bolzano thinks that the entity that can fit the bill here is for conceptual reasons God, who can be seen as ground of everything that happens, who omnisciently knows every effect and who with their holiness can only want good. Can we then find out divine purposes? Not completely, Bolzano admits, but thinks at least some of them could be discerned even before they occur, if we can estimate possible results of causal processes and decide which of them would create the most good in the world.

Returning to finite entities and their purposes, Bolzano distinguishes between cases where we already know that some event was a purposeful action and cases where even this is in doubt. The first case is, of course, simpler to solve, especially if we know the agent behind the action and perhaps even their thoughts and desires. In any case, Bolzano notes, we should begin by considering the action to be explained, then consider its different effects or consequences, actually and according to the ideas the person had at the time they made the decision. He admits this is clearly a difficult task, especially as we cannot be certain the person in question could have foreseen all the consequences of their action. Often for determining the purpose it is enough to know what they had wanted to happen, especially if we know some earlier decisions of the person. If their current action seems not in line with their previous actions, Bolzano explains, our explanation of its purpose can be explained only if it is more improbable that the person would not have acted in this manner than their acting in an unusual manner is.

The case of phenomena where we doubt a possible purpose behind it, Bolzano explains, occurs especially when we are explaining actions of other organic beings. Here, he notes, we observe that the phenomena resemble those occurring with our own bodies, which allows us to make the probable inference that they are caused by similar bodies and to assume that these bodies have similar souls. If we then observe in these bodies movements similar to those connected in our bodies with certain representations and sensations, we can assume they have similar representations and sensations. Little by little, Bolzano continues, such analogical inferences lead us to conviction that beside humans, there are innumerably many sensible beings of different species, but because we observe them generate only such effects that humans can generate without being distinctly conscious and without using reason, we can infer these are lower beings without reason.

Just like all causal explanations, Bolzano admits, explanations of purposes are fraught with possible errors. Too often we infer from what we would want to do to what others would want to do. In case of divine purposes, Bolzano adds, we take as a purpose something that actually isn’t, because it would befit us to declare it as divine purpose. In the case of humans and other finite beings, we often think as purposeful what is actually just accidental, that is, happened without foresight and will. Bolzano even admits that even our own purposes might elude us, especially if we would be prone to assume that we are innocent of some mischievous deed.

A special case of finding purposes, Bolzano goes on, involves interpreting a set of signs (usually spoken or written words). Interpretation means a problem of trying to understand what the author has wanted convey to the receiver of the message, but not what they really thought, in case they were lying. Sometimes the author and the interpreter might even coincide, Bolzano notes, if we are reading messages we have written in the past.

In order to make an interpretation, Bolzano explains, we must show that it is likely for someone to want to convey such a message, that is, it would be considered a duty, because the message would be useful or enjoyable to us, or at least conveying the message would be useful to the author, due to gaining some true or imagined benefit. We must also show that the used signs can be seen as means for awakening the required representations in someone’s mind, and although not perhaps the most suitable in general, at least the most suitable in the circumstances. This means, Bolzano states, that the signs should be natural or generally used or at least defined by the author.

Interpretation of the signs becomes easier, Bolzano points out, the more we know about the author: their circumstances, concepts, desires etc. The more rational we regard the author, the less we can expect errors of them, and the more ethical we regard them, the less unethical purposes we may expect of their signs. Even if the sign is simple and its meaning is arbitrary, Bolzano notes, it is still sometimes possible to guess what the author meant by it from the circumstances, for instance, if someone cries while being in danger.

A message conveyed by signs might be a testimonial that can be used as evidence for the truth of a proposition. Bolzano notes that the witness behind such a testimonial can be another human being, but also God. Bolzano goes into great detail with the latter case, admitting himself that he is stepping beyond bounds of logic proper, and suggests two criteria for recognising some event as a sign from God: the testimonial conveyed should be such that believing in it would make us better and happier and there should be extraordinary events that turn our attention to this message. and we cannot see any other benefits from it.

Returning to finite human beings, Bolzano notes that we should at first check whether a message conveyed by them is truly a testimonial. This means, firstly, checking whether the supposed testimonial was generated by its author willingly and consciously and whether we can find the person to whom the testimonial was directed to. Furthermore, Bolzano states, we should check if giving a testimonial was really a purpose of the author, because it was their duty or it somehow benefitted them, and there might not have been a purpose beyond giving a testimony.

After it has been verified that a message was meant as a testimony, the next task is to test its credibility. Bolzano divides this problem into two questions: can we rely on the person really saying what they think to be the truth and are they in a position to actually know what is the truth? If we have reasons to answer either one of the questions negatively, this lowers the probability of their testimonial, except in the rare case that they are dumb liars who accidentally tell the truth, when trying to deceive us.

We often have not just one, but several testimonials, some affirming, others denying the truth of a proposition. Bolzano explains that this requires weighing carefully the pros and cons of different witnesses on how credible their testimonials are. He notes some interesting considerations on the matter, such as that if two contradicting testimonials agree on something, the contradiction might weaken the credibility of this common part of their testimonials, because contradiction in general makes us doubt the truthfulness or the knowledge of the witnesses. Another interesting point Bolzano makes is that the uncertainty expressed by a witness decreases the believability of what they say, but if they are open about this uncertainty this may increase our trust in their truthfulness and their understanding.

Bolzano’s heuristics end with the consideration of the very general problem of finding new truths involving given objects or a type of objects. His quite general methods are, firstly, to go through truths we already know and find some new consequences from them, searching for grounds of the known truths and constructing completely new propositions and testing whether they are true or not.

sunnuntai 8. marraskuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – Logical investigations

Moving on to more particular rules of heuristics, Bolzano states that the essential question is what problems it is meaningful to solve. This meaningfulness, he adds, consists of two elements, firstly, whether it is probable that we can solve them, and secondly, whether the solutions would be useful. Concerning the latter, Bolzano especially highlights questions concerning our duties.

In order to choose the most meaningful problems, Bolzano contends, we should have some understanding of what kinds of problems we could have. Thus, the rest of this part of his logic is concentrated on presenting a wide array of types of problems that could come up in many disciplines and strategies for solving them. Especially the first half of this discussion contains problems that are properly logical, and a number of them seem rather artificial and make the reader wonder if they would really come up so often in particular sciences.

The first problem is the analysis of representations: are they simple or complex, and if they are complex, from which representations and in what manner are they put together? Bolzano notes that answering these questions is very difficult, because most of our representations are not clear and therefore their potential parts are not intuited. Thus, he says, we commonly make the mistake and state that a complex representation is simple, just because it is so familiar to us from childhood. Then again, Bolzano adds, it is also very common to take simple representations as complex, especially when they are subordinated to other representations that we therefore consider their parts (Bolzano's favourite example is trying to define actuality in terms of possibility).

Besides analysis, a fundamental problem is to check whether a representation corresponds to any actual or non-actual objects. This task, he adds, should usually be preceded by analysis, because simple representations are always real in the sense that they are not contradictory and thus possibly refer to an object. On the other hand, Bolzano states, from a complex representation it is often simple to check whether they have any obvious contradictions and are thus imaginary.

Even if we have established a representation to be real, Bolzano explains, it might still not actually refer to an object. Thus, he notes, we should proceed to check whether the representation presupposes an existing object or not. If it would refer to a non-existing object, like a number, Bolzano thinks, the consistency of the representation is enough to establish that it has an object. On the other hand, if it would refer to an actual object, the existence of such an object has to be established from conceptual truths or experience.

A somewhat more difficult problem is to check whether a representation refers to a singular object or several. Bolzano notes that if we can divide the representation into two representations contradicting one another and referring to objects (like triangles can be divided into those having a straight angle and those not), the answer is obvious. If we cannot find such a division, he adds, we can only with more or less confidence determine that it is singular. Sometimes, Bolzano points out, the very form reveals it (e.g., when we speak of a sum of all B), and even if it does not have such a form, but its objects do not exist, the determinations contained in the representation might be enough to determine the unique object (e.g. even numbers between 6 and 8). Bolzano thinks it a more difficult problem, if we have a pure concept, the objects of which should be actual: if the uniqueness is not determined by form, Bolzano is certain only of the notion of God as referring to a single object; of the other concepts of this type, if experience has shown that they refer to at least one object, he thinks it probable that they refer to more than one.

Because science should be as exact as possible, Bolzano considers it an important problem, whether a representation could be simplified by removing unnecessary determinations. In order to do this, he explains, we need to first analyse the parts of the representation and check if it has objects or not: if it has objects, we should try dropping its determinations one by one and seeing if it still refers to all the same objects; if it does not have objects, we should vary its constituents and thus turn it into a representation with objects and then do the dropping of determinations.

Moving on to cases with several representations, the obvious problem is what relations their extensions have. Bolzano goes into great detail to discuss these relations, but ultimately they all boil down to the question whether some combination of these representations or their negations refer to objects: for instance, representations A and B are compatible, if representation “something that is both A and B” has objects.

A somewhat different problem is that of finding similarities between objects. Bolzano notes that in order that we may give an answer other than trivial one that they are all things, we must have some representations of them. The problem then becomes analysing the representations and finding common characteristics shared by all of them. Bolzano actually gives not that much instructions on how to do this, but suggests that we should practice this kind of problem by thinking and comparing different kinds of things.

A natural contrast to the previous problem is, of course, that of finding differences between objects, in other words, characteristics that belong to one object, but not to another. Again, Bolzano says, we need some representations for the objects, but this time such that they are mutually exclusive, so that the representation referring to one object does not refer to the other object. Again, Bolzano has not so much instructions for this problem, but he suggests analysing the representations, in the hope of finding some characteristic belonging to one representation and not to the other. He also points out that although a single characteristic might not be the point of difference, a number of them put together could be it.

A problem combined of the two previous is that of finding a characteristic shared by all given objects, but differentiating it from another group of objects or even from all other objects. As we might guess from the two previous problems, Bolzano notes that to even begin solving the problem, we need two sets of representations: in other words, to find out similarities within one group of objects, we need representations for each of the objects, and to differentiate this group from another group, we need another set of representations, the two sets being mutually exclusive. In fact, Bolzano points out that we can even weaken these conditions and assume only that we have one set of representations exclusive to one group objects and another set covering both groups, since representations required for the second group can be defined in terms of the common representations and of the negations of the representations in the first group.

Bolzano moves on tackle a group of problems that involve finding a representation with a certain relation to a given group of objects, whether it is a case of this representation covering at least these objects, covering these objects and also more objects, covering only a part of these objects, covering exactly these objects, covering less than the whole group, but more than a given part of it or even covering a part of these objects together with some other objects. Especially the more complex problems feel very contrived, although they do include the problem of dividing a group of objects into a number of mutually exclusive representations. As with the problems of finding similarities and differences, Bolzano states, we require some representations that cover these objects (and in some cases, excluding all other objects), and indeed, pretty much all of them hinge on finding some similarities between these given representations.

Bolzano moves on to suggest problems involving judgements or propositions. Just like with representations, the fundamental problem is to analyse the judgements into their constituents. From these constituents, he continues, we can determine most of the internal characteristics of a judgement. The only exception, Bolzano points out, is the question whether the judgement is analytical or synthetical, which we must test by varying the parts of the judgement and seeing whether it remains true or false.

Just like with representations, Bolzano says, one problem concerns the relation of different propositions. The peculiarity of his logic is that many of these relations are defined in terms of variable constituents of propositions. Thus. to see whether two propositions are compatible, we need to see whether we can choose such values of variables that make both of them true. In some cases, Bolzano points out, such tests would have to be done infinitely many times, for instance, in case of derivability, which is defined as the derivable proposition being true with all values that make its premisses true. Bolzano notes that establishing such derivability must then be done by formal considerations used in the doctrine of inferences or by means of concrete sciences.

An obvious problem involving propositions is to test whether they are true. Bolzano notes that a necessary preliminary for this task is to decide whether the proposition in question is purely conceptual or empirical. In the former case, he thinks, a true proposition would be either self-evident or based on some self-evident truths. In the latter case, Bolzano continues, only the falsity of the proposition can be established conceptually, that is, by showing that it contradicts some conceptual truth. If we want to confidently assert the truth of an empirical proposition, he notes, we must first show that its subject term refers to some object and then establish that there is no perception that contradicts the proposition and that many of our perceptions agree with it in the sense of being derivable from it. All of these questions, Bolzano states, can usually be answered only with probable answers, while in some cases we may even know that the question cannot be settled through mere empirical means.

Bolzano defines proof, firstly, as anything used for directing the attention of a thinker in order to generate in their mind a judgement that they did not assent to before or at least not with the same degree of confidence. In this sense, proofs can be even sensuous objects and changes, but Bolzano gives a more restricted definition of proofs, covering only sets of judgements or propositions that mediate our judgements. An obvious problem is to test how convincing a proof for a proposition is, especially from the standpoint of the thinker searching for truth (Bolzano saves the question of how convincing a proof is from the standpoint of a learner to another place). This problem boils down to two questions: can we assume all our premisses (even the implicit ones) with sufficient degree of confidence and is the supposed conclusion derivable from these propositions or from a part of them or do they at least provide for the conclusion a degree of probability over doubtfulness? Bolzano concentrates his attention especially on the second question, pointing out signs how to recognise traditional fallacies in proofs.

After these rather logical questions, Bolzano moves on to deal with more substantial problems involving grounds of propositions. In fact, these are so fundamental questions that they deserve a post of their own.

keskiviikko 28. lokakuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – Heuristics

The ultimate aim of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre or logic is the division of the whole field of human knowledge in disciplines, thus, he thinks it important to investigate how truths are discovered. Then again, he adds, logic should concern only with such heuristic rules that relate to thinking and its general applicability, because these are often of use in making scholarly treatises, while rules about, for instance, the proper use of senses fall out of its scope. Bolzano divides these rules into general rules applicable to all science and particular rules applicable to many, but not all kinds of investigation: we shall follow him in this division and leave the particular rules to the next post.

Before going to the general rules, Bolzano investigates the notion of thinking or meditation (Nachdenken in German). Commonly, he says, thinking means any series of representations and judgements, but Bolzano does not find this a good definition, since representations and judgements are constantly going on in our minds, even when we are not actively meditating anything. Thus, Bolzano excludes from the realm of meditation any stream of representations and judgements that are generated with no help of our will, like impressions caused by external objects. Even when our will has an influence, it is not meditation, he adds, if the aim is something else than just generating a certain species of judgements, for instance, when we seek satisfying representations (even dreamers do such things).

Meditation requires, Bolzano explains, that we awaken in ourselves representations and judgements with a definite and conscious purpose that we finally arrive at a judgement which has a certain characteristic: for instance, when someone tries to convince themselves that a judgement is true or when someone calculates something. Furthermore, he adds, if we are speaking of a pure mediation, the means by which our will generates the representations and judgements must be of a certain kind, so that our thinking is not influenced by the perceptions of external objects. Still, Bolzano contends, even pure meditation cannot be completely removed from all physical interaction, because the effect of the will on our representations is always mediated by our body. Then again, he notes, pure meditation cannot use the body as means, since bodily observations are not meditation.

Bolzano finally comes to the conclusion that pure meditation can be conjoined with unconscious influence on the body and even on other bodies: think of a person in deep concentration, who is mumbling or tapping their foot unconsciously. Thus, he explains, in meditation we generate, with nothing more but this possible unconscious interaction with the external objects, representations and judgements that we require to arrive at a judgement we search for.

Logic, Bolzano explains, is especially interested in meditation that is primed for searching for truth: in other words, meditation in logic tries to find an answer to some question. He divides truth searching meditation into recalling, where the truth is already familiar to us, but not just present in our mind, and discovery, where the truth is new and unknown (just to us or even to all humans). discovery; it is indifferent whether the truth is unfamiliar just to us or also to all humans). Furthermore, he defines speculation as meditation, where the truth that is searched and the propositions that we observe for the sake of finding the truth are conceptual propositions.

The actual rules Bolzano suggests are, as he himself admits, nothing original. Thus, he says, we should choose what kind of truths we want to search, since we can know only a finite number of truths. Furthermore, Bolzano notes, some questions cannot even be answered, and if it can be done easily, we should first check this possibility. Indeed, he adds, often we must solve a set of preliminary questions, before we can answer the primary question.

As for the actual methods of discovery, Bolzano mentions first the direct method, where we move forward from truths we already know through inferences and – hopefully – arrive at the answer we are searching for. The other possibility is an indirect method, where we construct a proposition that might be the truth that we are looking for – a hypothesis – and test whether it really is true. Indirect method, Bolzano explains, has many subspecies, such as apagogical method, where we start from a negation of the assumed truth and try to derive absurdities from it, analytical method, where we start from a hypothesis and test its possible grounds, and induction, where we test a sufficient number of instances of the hypothesis and determine at least that it is probable. He also notes that often only one method is not enough, but e.g. direct method must be used in conjunction with some form of indirect method.

This would exhaust the scope of pure meditation, but Bolzano still includes some rules that are commonly useful in investigating problems. Thus, he notes the usefulness of experiences, both those that we hear from reliable witnesses and those we have made ourselves. Furthermore, Bolzano reminds the reader of the importance of testing occasionally even judgements we have earlier deemed to be true and of analysing their reliability, although he notes that we cannot really do the so-called Cartesian doubt, since testing always requires assuming some judgements as criteria. Bolzano also emphasises the role of attention in guiding our thinking, of the capacity to use signs to give our thoughts more stability, of mental images in making our thoughts more vivid and of logical analysis to help us make inferences from our judgements.

sunnuntai 18. lokakuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – Degrees of confidence

Bolzano defines certain or secure judgement as being generated in such a manner that there is no possibility of error. He notes at once that certainty in this sense is a contextual notion, related to a certain thinker who holds a judgement to be true. Thus, Bolzano says, for God, all truths are certain, while for us, only those are certain that we know immediately or that we have derived from immediately known truths without probable inferences.

Bolzano divides erroneous judgements into four groups, on the basis of whether all the premisses of these judgements are true or whether at least one of them is false and whether the judgement in question is a probable conclusion of the premisses or whether it is just imagined to be so. He manages to simplify this classification by noting that in cases of imagined inference, we could take the erroneous rule of probable inference as one premiss, which of course is then a false premiss.

Bolzano divides probable judgements into those where we know their probability and those where we don’t know it. If we know the probability of a judgement, he continues dividing, the judgement might be either held to be true or not (in quantitative terms, this depends on whether the value of probability is greater than ½ or not). If a probable proposition is held to be true, this probability can be either real and objective, if all its premisses are true, or then just assumed and subjective, if some premisses are false. In case of objective probability, Bolzano suggests, the premisses are then partial grounds of the probability of judgement – he emphasises that they are not grounds of the judgement, although they are causes of us having the judgement (that is, what he earlier has called grounds of knowledge).

Bolzano also divides probability into contextual or relative and complete or absolute probability, depending on whether the probability of the judgement is calculated in relation to just a part of judgements held to be true by the thinker or in relation to the whole collection of them. If the absolute probability is so high that it would be ridiculous to even consider its negation to be true, Bolzano calls the judgement believable or morally certain.

Bolzano returns to the notion of confidence in judgement, which has earlier just mentioned in passing, characterising it only as coming in degrees. The question is why we have different degrees of confidence: could it be that before we even assent to a judgement, we ascribe to it a definite degree of probability, on the basis of which we decide how confident we are in its truth? Bolzano admits that this might be the case sometimes, but certainly not with all judgements, because ascribing a probability to a judgment is a new judgement, leading us to an infinite regression, since our degree of confidence in this new judgement would require another judgement on its probability. He notes that especially immediate judgements are not preceded by a judgement of their certainty, since otherwise they wouldn’t be immediate. Furthermore, Bolzano continues, not even all mediate judgements cannot be preceded by a judgement of their probability, because this latter judgement would again be a mediate judgement, leading us to a new infinite regression.

Bolzano suggests as an answer that the probability of judgements, even when it goes unnoticed by us, is connected to a force that the judgement has to affect our confidence in it. Thus, he concludes, our confidence in a judgement is determined, firstly, by the absolute probability of the judgement in relation to all the current judgements in our minds, and secondly, by the degree of confidence these previous judgements have in our minds. Bolzano considers the question, whether there might be other influences, and at once rules out the possibility that forgotten judgements had something to do with our confidence. He does admit that differences in our attention and our wishes on truth or falsity of some matters might affect our confidence, but suggests that this influence happens mediately through judgements they evoke.

Bolzano suggests enumerating our degree of confidence in the immediate judgements and judgements derived from these with no use of probable inferences as 1 – this would be the highest quantity confidence could have. Our confidence in judgements derived with probable inferences would then be less than 1. Bolzano suggests calling such a less than fully certain confidence a moral confidence or conviction, if the respective probability is so high that the judgment is morally certain, while otherwise the judgement would be a mere opinion.

How is the degree of confidence then calculated? If the probability of a proposition is ½, Bolzano thinks, our confidence in it would have to be 0, since then we are not at all confident in the judgement, and indeed, do not even hold it or its negation to be true. Thus, he suggests defining the confidence in a judgement as the difference of the probability of the judgement and the probability of its negation, that is, if the probability of judgement is presented as a fraction m/n, then the confidence would be m/n – (n – m)/n = (2m – n)/n. Bolzano notes that the confidence in a judgement could then get negative values up to –1, but this means just that our confidence in the negation of the judgement has the respective positive value.

perjantai 16. lokakuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – Does knowledge have any limits?

Just like the study of propositions was followed by the study of truths, Bolzano moves from the study of judgements to consider their relation to truth. More precisely, his question is how both true and false judgements are generated. Knowing especially the sources of error, Bolzano suggests, helps us to avoid them altogether. On the side of true judgements, he adds, it should be helpful to know if our knowledge has any intrinsic limits.

Before getting to the actual investigation, Bolzano wants to define the notions of knowledge and error and also the related notion of ignorance. He suggests first defining knowledge as truthful judgement, but quickly notes that with this definition, something we weren’t asserting at the moment would not be knowledge. Thus, Bolzano finally lands to the definition that knowledge is a truthful judgement that we have assented to at some point and that we can recollect and would continue to assent to, when explicitly asked.

Bolzano notes that the concept of error refers to judgements. We do say, he admits, that we have an erroneous concept of a thing, but then we just mean that we make erroneous judgements about the thing. Similarly, Bolzano contends, ignorance should refer to judgements, since in case of concepts we can instead speak of their absence. Thus, he defines ignorance as not having a certain piece of knowledge, regardless of whether the respective judgement has never been made or whether it is just not recollected. Error, then, is for Bolzano a false judgement that one has assented to at some point and that they can recollect and would continue to assent to. He also points out that assenting to propositions that imply a specific knowledge or a specific error is still not enough for having this specific knowledge or error without an explicit assent.

Bolzano states that we are clearly ignorant of infinitely many truths, because our mind is too finite to contain all of them. More precisely, he adds, we are ignorant of truths, because we do not have the relevant representations, or in case of mediated judgements, because we haven't been able to do the proper inference, either because the required premisses are never at the same time in our mind or because we lack the capacity for the required inference.

Bolzano starts his investigation of errors by noting that it is not rational to doubt the truth of our immediate judgements: If we doubted one of them, we should doubt all of them, since they are all generated in the same manner, and in fact, we would have to doubt all of judgements, since ultimately they are based on immediate judgements.

Moving on to discuss derived judgements, Bolzano notes that we really cannot doubt the basic rules of inference we use, again, because that would undermine our reliance on all of our derived judgements. What we can doubt and what can cause errors, he suggests, is when our inferences involve probability. In other words, it is not their probability that is to be doubted, but our instinctual habit of accepting highly probable propositions as true, although there is a slight possibility they are not. This means, Bolzano argues, that any entities, like God, that do not use probable inferences, are incapable of error. Furthermore, he adds, erroneous judgements are not completely certain, but they do have a deceptive look of a truth, due to their high probability.

Most judgements based on probability are experiential, Bolzano thinks, but he does not rule out purely conceptual judgements that use probability. Indeed, he states, every time we use recollected premisses in our inferences, we are involved with probabilities, since we cannot be completely certain on what basis we accepted them.

Bolzano notes that the general description of the cause of errors does not yet give us proper tools to avoid errors, since we cannot just reject all probable inferences. Thus, he gives a more detailed explanation on the causes that especially make us think false propositions as probable. The list is not very original, as Bolzano himself admits: ignorance, reliance on incidental connections, unreliable memory, too weak or too lively imagination, inclinations of our own will, ambiguousness of words and influence of other people are all among possibve causes of errors.

The discussion of error has taught us, Bolzano continues, that judgements are necessarily true, if they are immediate or derived from immediate judgements by inferences that do not involve probability. Mediate judgements can be at times or accidentally true, even if derived by probable proofs, he adds, and even if they are derived from false judgements through inferences.

Bolzano reminds us that some of our true judgements are based on knowing the ground of that truth. The question is can we know truths otherwise than from their grounds. Bolzano answers at once that at least immediate judgements are not known from grounds. Then again, he continues, some truths have no ground – these are the so-called fundamental truths. Could all our immediate judgements be fundamental truths? Bolzano denies this, because our immediate perceptual judgements have a ground, since perceptions have a cause. Furthermore, he continues, knowledge based on probability does not presuppose knowledge of the ground, and in fact, when making judgements of experience, we seem to never know the grounds before the consequences. This leaves still the question of conceptual truths, in finding of which we require probability at most for recollecting earlier known truths. Immediate pure conceptual truths could be taken as fundamental truths, Bolzano conjectures, but he is apprehensive about truths derived solely from such fundamental truths: since there usually are many possible ways to prove them, but there should be only one ground for one consequence, we most likely do know some derived conceptual truths on the basis of something else than their ground.

If a judgement is not immediately made, Bolzano reminds us, it is derived from other judgements, which are then the cause of the first judgement. If the first proposition is true, the collection of the judgements from which it is derived could be called the ground of this knowledge – actually, Bolzano thinks, it should be more proper to call them the cause of knowledge, but this is not a commonly used term. Grounds of knowledge can, of course, contain false judgements and they need not be grounds in the proper sense of the word, thus, Bolzano divides them into objective grounds of knowledge, which are also proper grounds, and subjective grounds of knowledge, which are not.

As Bolzano has stated a number of times, we can know only a finite amount of truths at a time, but this does not yet imply that there would be a definite limit on what we can know. Considering what finding limits of our knowledge would mean, he first suggests simply that it would imply determining what we can know what we cannot. Then again, Bolzano reminds the reader, we can know truths accidentally even through errors. To make the idea of the limits of knowledge more stable, he then suggests including within them only truths that we can reach in a regular fashion.

Bolzano continues by stating that the notion of the limits of knowledge is still ambiguous: we might speak of limits for a certain purpose, my individual limits or limits of all humanity or even limits for all conscious beings, limits for the time being and limits for the end of times. He suggests that the aim of determining these limits in logic should be to show where we need not put our efforts in searching for the truth. Thus, it would make sense to speak either of our own or of the limits of humanity. It would also not be useful to know only the current limits of our knowledge, Bolzano suggests, since those can change in the future.

Going to the concrete question of determining these limits, Bolzano notes that this cannot be done by simply stating the truths we cannot know, since then we would in fact know them. He suggests that we could instead mention generally the objects, of which we can know nothing, but notes at once that we can know something of every object, for instance, characteristic it shares with all objects in general: and indeed, even the judgement “we can know nothing of this object” would also be a truth we know of this object.

Moving further with the idea, Bolzano suggests that maybe we could point out objects, of which we cannot know anything that is proper to these objects. His answer is that since we have to be able to have a representation of the object even to speak about it, we do know something that is proper to it (this representation). Another possibility is that the limits of knowledge would limit knowing any such proper characteristic of the objects in question that are not included in their representation. Bolzano thinks proving such unknowability would have to be based on the proper characteristic of the object included in its representation, but admits knowing no such proof. In addition, he sees a possible contradiction lurking here: if we could probe unknowability in this sense, it would actually be a characteristic proper to the object, but not included in its representation.

The only possibility Bolzano can think of anymore is that we might point out propositions of which we could never know whether they are true or false. The problem is that he sees no way to prove propositions to be unknowable: although we haven’t decided their truth now, we could find means to decide the issue in the future. Indeed, Bolzano states, it has sometimes taken hundreds of years to find out proofs for conceptual truths, and in case of judgements with experiential elements, further experiences in the future might decide the issue about their truth,

Bolzano again admits that his conclusions on the limits of knowledge are not revolutionary and points out that most non-sceptical philosophers would agree with him. The clear exceptions are Kant and his followers, who thought they could define strict limits to human knowledge. Bolzano has already rejected some key elements of Kant’s philosophy, which underlie also Kant’s notion of the limits of knowledge. Still, Bolzano criticizes the idea yet again from another angle.

Bolzano finds even Kant’s division of proper sciences into just four parts (logic, arithmetic, geometry and pure physics) faulty, because it lacks all practical sciences and aesthetics. He also considers it absurd that Kant insisted logic would consist of mere analytical judgements. Indeed, Bolzano lists many synthetic judgements of logic, such that there are representations and that every proposition can be divided into at least three parts. Even rules of inference are synthetic judgements, he thinks. Then again, as we have already seen, Bolzano considered arithmetics to be more analytical than logic and definitely not dependent on any intuition of time. What Bolzano finds particularly faulty in Kant’s notion of the four sciences is that they contained only universally recognised truths, because he thinks their great certainty rises only from the ease of empirically testing their most important theorems, possibility to infer the rest of their theorems and lack of human passion concerning them.

Kant especially thought we could not say anything about supersensuous objects, because we can make synthetic judgements only of what we perceive immediately, since space and time are a necessary condition on what we can know. Bolzano thinks it not at all clear what we should include among such objects. Usually, he says, by sensuous objects we mean such that can generate perceptions by affecting our organs, that is, bodies, which would mean that simple substances, of which bodies consist, are not sensuous – still, they exist in time and space. Similarly, Bolzano continues, the soul should be supersensuous (since we do not perceive it as such), but it also exists in time (because it changes) and in space (because it interacts with things in space). In fact, he concludes, only God is not in space and time, because God does not change, although in a sense God is in all space as time as their creator.

Bolzano also thinks that there are many true metaphysical judgements about these supersensuous objects that we know – his examples include “God exists”, “no simple substance can be destroyed”, and “representations can occur only in simple substances”. He admits that we have not found the proper grounds for these judgements, but they still are known to be true judgements, and indeed, we still lack proper foundations in most of our sciences, since we haven’t been able to properly define even such crucial notions as space in geometry.

Bolzano goes into great detail in pointing out missteps in Kant’s proofs of antinomies and we need not follow him there – the faults of these proofs have been many times attested by several philosophers. Instead, we should point out that Bolzano finds Kant’s notion of practical proofs of God, freedom and immortality preposterous: surely we cannot first suppose that we ought to strive for some end (in Kant’s case, the greatest good) and then just say that the preconditions of this end must be possible, but instead, we should first ascertain that achieving the very end is possible and only then conclude that it is something we ought to strive for.

lauantai 10. lokakuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – What are judgements made of?

From subjective representations, Bolzano moves to judgements. He underlines that judgements are not representations – if we just represent a proposition, we do not judge or assert the matter to be so. Still, he admits, judgements do share some characteristics with subjective representations. Both have a stuff: with subjective representations it is an objective representation, with judgements it is a proposition. Furthermore, just like subjective representations, judgements are actual, but only as adhering to a soul.

Propositions are constituted of representations, Bolzano reminds us, and so should judgements consist of subjective representations. He states that parts of a judgement coexist or at least the earlier parts have not completely vanished when the later parts occur in our mind. Then again, Bolzano adds, just like coexistence of representations does not mean that a combined representation exists, the coexistence of the parts of judgement does not mean that the judgement exists. He also suggests that the formation of judgements is not completely voluntary, although we can affect it by choosing what representations we attend to.

Just like with representations, Bolzano finds it convenient to speak of one judgement, when the same person judges the same objective proposition uninterruptedly. This means that judgements are different, if they have different propositions as stuff, belong to different thinkers or are discontinuous in time. Bolzano also suggests that similarity of judgements presupposes at least that they have the same proposition as their stuff.

Bolzano thinks that many other features and types of representations apply also to judgements. Examples of these include clarity, distinctness and liveliness (then again, he notes that confidence or certainty is a feature unique to judgements). Other classifications, such as the distinction between analytical and synthetical, judgements derive from propositions.

Just like representations, Bolzano points out, our judgements come and go: indeed, it is very common that our opinions change over time. Judgements also leave traces on our soul, which makes it possible to recollect our judgements. Of course, Bolzano adds, we may deny a judgement we recollect asserting in the past or our confidence about it might have changed.

Bolzano moves on to the question how our judgements are generated. Some of them, he points out, have been caused or mediated by other judgements through the use of inference. Bolzano recognises three types of mediation: firstly, that based on objective consequence relation, secondly, that based on other relations of derivability, and finally, that based on probability. He finds the first two unproblematic: objective grounds can also cause judgements in us, while knowing relations of derivability is just something where we resemble God, although in a restricted manner. Probability relations, on the other hand, are something God in their omniscience cannot be dealing with. Indeed, Bolzano suggests, using probabilities in inferences arises from the limitedness of our powers of cognition – great enough of probability makes us confident of a judgement, and after a time, we forget that it is just probable and remember only the judgement.

Mediated judgements must ultimately be based on some unmediated judgements, Bolzano argues. These include, he says, judgements like “I have the appearance A”, where A could be, for instance, a representation, a judgement, a sensation or a decision, and also judgements of the type “this, what I intuit here and now, is an A”, where the A could be something like red, fragrant or sour (he does note that sometimes the latter kind of propositions are mediated, for instance, if we know that something that we see is of a kind that is salty, we can deduce that this what I see is salty). Bolzano calls immediate judgements of both kinds perception judgements, while all mediated judgements referring to intuitions he names experiential judgements.

All mediated judgements cannot arise from mere perceptual judgements, Bolzano contends, for instance, because we need something more to show that our intuitions presuppose some external thing that has generated them. Thus, he concludes, we need pure conceptual judgements that describe connections between pure concepts. In this way, Bolzano goes against any mere empirical explanation of the origin of our judgements. This does not mean, he adds, that just insisting on two sources of judgements – intuitions and concepts – is enough.

Bolzano goes into great detail in studying especially the views of Kant and some of the more prominent Kantians, but finds their explanations unsatisfying. While Kant found the explanation of analytical judgements simple, Bolzano thinks these judgements contain unexpected difficulties. Analytical judgement, as defined by Kant, should be such that the subject contains the predicate – so basically, Bolzano notes, of the form “something that is both A and B is A”. Although seemingly self-evident, he points out, they presuppose that there is some A that is also a B (taking the often used example, “all bachelors are unmarried” presupposes that there are bachelors, that is, unmarried men).

Bolzano’s take on Kant’s analytic judgements might seem a bit pedantic (and dependent on his reading of universal propositions as making an existential commitment), but his take on what Kant calls a posteriori judgements is more interesting. Kant had suggested, Bolzano says, that such judgements are based on intuitions. Bolzano thinks this is an inadequate explanation, since singular intuition cannot justify universal judgements like “all bodies have weight”. Indeed, he goes further and insists that even a singular judgement like “this body has weight” is not explained by mere intuitions. Either the notion of the weight is simply included in our intuition of this body, and then we would be discussing simply an analytic judgement, or more likely, this singular judgement says something like “this body that is the cause of other intuitions (e.g. colour, smell etc.) is also a cause of our intuition of weight”, which is something not justified by mere intuitions.

What Kant finds truly difficult, that is, the so-called synthetic a priori judgements, but insofar as they coincide with what Bolzano himself calls pure conceptual judgements, he thinks they are rather unproblematic – we shall see a bit later how Bolzano accounts for them. On the contrary, Bolzano finds Kant’s explanation of them wanting. Kant’s solution is to rely on the so-called pure intuitions of space and time, but if they are supposed to work like the regular intuitions with a posteriori judgements, Bolzano argues, they do not work at all.

Bolzano goes further to analyse the Kantian notion of pure intuition, which should differ from empirical intuitions by not being generated by actual objects, but by imagination. Bolzano wonders why this would make any difference, since imagined objects are just less lively than intuitions of actual objects. Of course, Kant had suggested that it was not regular imagination that he was discussing, but pure imagination – Bolzano finds this a meaningless wordplay. Kant did suggest as a difference that empirical imagination generated images and pure imagination only pure schemes, that is, rules for finding images for a concept. Bolzano finds this even more perplexing: why call such a scheme an intuition? Indeed, he says, Kant’s scheme seems to coincide with what was traditionally called a genetic definition, which is essentially something conceptual.

Looking at concrete examples of synthetic a priori judgements, as discussed by Kant, Bolzano comes to the conclusion that Kantian notion of pure intuition shows infatuation with the idea that geometric proofs are based on constructions of figures in our imagination. Bolzano himself suggests that using such constructions as substantial steps in geometric proofs just shows the still inadequate condition of this science. Indeed, while they make proofs more lively in simple cases, with more complex figures they soon become too imprecise.

Bolzano finds even more to complain in Kant’s extension of the need of construction to arithmetics. Looking at the famous Kantian example, 7 + 5 = 12, Bolzano contends that a true notion of arithmetic sum would imply its associativity, that is, the fact that (a + b) + c = a + (b + c). If numbers are then defined by their relation to the predecessor (e.g. 7 = 6 + 1), proving the required judgement becomes just a simple task of using these definitions and associativity. True, Kant insists that such a process would require using time, but Bolzano finds this objection preposterous: equally well one can say that any sorites, that is, combination of several steps of syllogisms, takes up time, but Kant is still not saying that they require construction in time.

Returning to Bolzano’s own explanation of the origin of judgements, the immediate judgements he finds easy to account for. The first type of perceptual judgement, “I have appearance X”, just requires that we can have clear representations of our mental phenomena. With the second type, “what I intuit here is A”, the only problem Bolzano finds is that A can be a very complex representation, but he suggests that even such complex representation could be gradually built over time, when we attend to changes in our soul. The immediate conceptual judgements Bolzano finds even more unproblematic: we just require an ability to generate the pure concepts in question, perhaps occasioned, but not justified by other judgements, while combining these pure concepts into judgements is based on nothing more than immediately observing their relations.

The only real problem, Bolzano argues, is that many of our judgements have been generated at such an early time in our life that we are not anymore aware of the inferences we have required in generating them. Especially our judgements of temporal relations are problematic, he emphasises and adds that Kant never really addressed this question, at least when it comes to temporal relations of our representations, just assuming that we have an immediate awareness of some of our representations being earlier than others. Bolzano contends that this is something we cannot intuit immediately, but then again, we cannot derive it from observing external changes, since seeing something as change already requires an understanding of temporal relations.

Bolzano suggests as an ultimate basis of temporal judgements that we must be able to perceive that our mental phenomena occur at this moment, now. Furthermore, he continues, we can also observe that some of our representations conflict with one another in the sense that they cannot occur at the same time (for instance, judgement that A is true and judgement that A is false, or wish and sensation of its fulfilment). Sometimes, Bolzano argues, we are aware of an appearance as occurring now and a trace or a memory of a conflicting appearance. Thus, he suggests, we get our first notion of some of our appearances occurring at different times: we remember something that occurred, but is not occurring now. Series of representations can form even our first, although rather crude way of measuring time (think of a person counting in their head “one, two, …”).

According to Bolzano, we can distinguish between external and internal intuitions, and of the former we know that they have been brought about by external objects with an ability to generate intuitions in us (apparently this is based on a conceptual judgement on the nature of external intuitions). If we have similar intuitions, he continues, we can draw the probable conclusion that they have been generated by the same thing: this is not a certain conclusion, because sometimes different things provide similar intuitions. Furthermore if a group of intuitions always occurs at the same time, we can draw the probable conclusion that they have been caused by one thing with different powers. We still have to explain why this thing does not cause these intuitions always, and in some cases, the examples of which we do not need to deal here, we can infer that it has been a question of our spatial distance from the thing being different.

Bolzano goes into more details in his explanation of these processes. The important point here is that these inferences, as they occur in an animal or in a small child, are more like associations that slowly build up a set of judgements. Of course, they are not clear judgements, that is, judgements that the animal or the child would be aware of. In case of a child, Bolzano states, when they reach a suitable age, the resulting judgements start to gain clarity.

torstai 1. lokakuuta 2026

Bernard Bolzano: Study of science – Thinking representations (again?)

After a rather modern take on logic in the so-called elementary study, Bolzano returns to the idea that logic deals with human cognitive capacities. His justification is that such epistemological considerations are necessary for evaluating the suggested rules for finding truths and for organising them into individual sciences. Bolzano states that studying cognitions means essentially studying judgements and their constituents or representations. Furthermore, he adds, since cognitions form a specific subset of judgements, because all cognitions are true, logic should also study the relation of judgements to truth. Finally, Bolzano suggests investigating the degrees of reliability of judgements.

Starting with representations, we have to emphasise that it is not what Bolzano called representations in themselves that we are dealing with here, but subjective representations, which are more like appearances of representations in themselves in some mind. He also emphasises that in difference from a common way of speaking, he does not refer by representations only to representations of absent things, but to any constituents of our judgements that are not full judgements.

Bolzano begins familiarly with characteristics common to all subjective representations, first of which is that all of them are connected to some representation in itself. He sets out to prove this statement by asking the reader to imagine someone thinking of a representation A. Then, Bolzano states, “this person has representation” is a true proposition, even if no one is thinking of this proposition. This proposition, he concludes, has as one of its constituent the representation in itself of A, corresponding to the subjective representation A. Bolzano suggests calling this representation in itself the stuff (Stoff) of the subjective representation, distinguishing it clearly from its matter – the further subjective representation, of which it is constituted – and its object, which all subjective representations might not even have.

Bolzano emphasises that all subjective representations exist. He admits that we do say that something is just a representation, but then we merely mean that it does not refer to an existing object. Although existing, Bolzano explains, subjective representation is not an independent substance, but a characteristic of some mind: not an external characteristic or relation, but an internal characteristic or property.

Bolzano moves on to consider the question when subjective representations are same or similar. He suggests that subjective representations are numerically different at least when the corresponding representations in themselves are different or when they are thought by different persons. Bolzano notes that God is always thinking of all of the representations, so that there are as many divine subjective representations as there are representations in themselves. With humans, on the other hand, the subjective representations are constantly changing, but Bolzano thinks it convenient to think of them as holding their identity, as long as there is temporal continuity, so that any discontinuity in time would make the representations different.

Similarity of subjective representations, Bolzano goes on, requires at least the same representation in itself as stuff. Clearly, he adds, we can say that two subjective representations at different times are similar, but can we have similar representations at one and same time? Bolzano notes that we can have many different representations at the same time, for example, when we are thinking of judgements. Thus, he continues, we might think that, for instance, in a judgement like “a triangle with all angles similar has all sides similar” has two similar representations of similarity. Still, Bolzano finds it more plausible that it is just the same representation of similarity that is mentioned at two spots of this judgement, thus preferring the notion that we can speak of similarity of representations only in case of representations had at different times.

As actual entities, Bolzano points out, subjective representations have different effects. Such different effects may result from the corresponding representations in themselves – for instance, thinking snakes feels different from thinking flowers – or from the relation that the representation in itself has to other representations in themselves – thinking snakes is a different experience, depending on whether we are considering venomous or non-venomous snakes. Bolzano also points out that much depends also on an internal characteristic of the subjective representation he calls its strength or liveliness: stronger representations move us more.

Evidently all divisions of representations in themselves apply also to subjective representations, but Bolzano considered only few more prominent cases. Thus, he notes that we clearly have complex representations, which means that we must also have simple representations. Bolzano thinks it plausible that we never have just a single simple representation, because we are also aware of, for instance, words describing such a representation. Then again, he carefully distinguishes thinking of a mere collection of simple representations from thinking of a complex representation, since the latter still requires combining the constituents into a unity.

Important subsets of subjective representations, Bolzano states, are that of subjective intuitions – these are simple and refer only to one object – and that of subjective pure concepts – these are not intuitions and do not also have intuitions as constituents. Bolzano argues that we have intuitions, since we have representations that we regard as effects of a single actual object represented by this representation (say, the representation of “this smell”). He also thinks that we have pure concepts, using the notion “and” as an example. Bolzano underlines as an important type of intuition those that we have of our own representations.

A very common way to divide subjective representations, Bolzano points out, has been that between clear and obscure representations, but he finds most explanations of this difference lacking. The best explanation suggested, Bolzano thinks, has been to define clear representations through our being conscious of them, but what does this consciousness mean? Clearly, if we judge that we have a representation, this is a clear representation we are conscious of, but Bolzano deems the existence of such a judgement to be a too strong demand of clarity: picture two otherwise similar representations, only one of which we judge to be our representation – wouldn’t both still be clear? Of course, at least an ability to make such a judgement characterises our consciousness of representation, but Bolzano finds an ability to do something a rather weak basis for a definition.

Bolzano continues by noting that in order to judge that we have a representation, we need a representation of this representation. Then again, the converse is not true or we can have a representation of a representation without judging that we have this representation. Thus, Bolzano suggests as the first definition of clarity of a representation that we have a representation referring exclusively to this clear representation. He notes that this definition still leaves undetermined whether the representing representation is an intuition or a complex representation. Considering the complex representation of a representation we have a month ago, he states that it is obvious that only intuitions can be representations representing a clear representation. Bolzano also points out that mere ability to intuit a representation is not a sufficient mark for its clarity, since it is the actual intuition that gives our representations clarity, for instance, when we actually intuit having pain, instead of just being in pain, but not intuiting it.

Armed with this definition of clear representations, Bolzano thinks it obvious that we do intuit some of our representations. He is also adamant that some of our representations are obscure or such that we do not intuit them. Otherwise, Bolzano argues, we would have infinitely many representations, since we would intuit a representation, then intuit this intuition and so forth.

Another common division of representations is that between distinct and confused representations, and Bolzano follows the usual definitions quite faithfully. Thus, he takes distinct representations to be such where we know its possible constituent representations and how they are combined. A clear difference in Bolzano’s definition from those of some of his predecessors is that he can accept also simple representations as distinct, as long as we just know that it does not have any constituents. He also notes that distinctness has degrees and defines a complete distinct representation as such where we know how it is formed of its ultimate, simple constituents.

Bolzano has already stated that God’s subjective representations are eternal, but is it so with humans? Looking specifically at intuitions of external things, Bolzano notes that they are caused by external things affecting us, thus, making at least their come and go with this interaction. Then again, other representations are more dependent on our own activities. For instance, intuitions of our own representations depend on our attention toward our own mind, while simple concepts, Bolzano explains, are generated together with activities by which form representations from other representations (e.g. the concept of “not”) or judgements from representations (e.g. the concept of “having”). Thus, he concludes, these representations come and go together with such activities.

Although representations come and go, Bolzano suggests that they do leave some traces in our soul. Such traces, he explains, are the main reason why we can later draw from our memory representations that we know resemble those that we have had earlier. This drawing of memories or recollection follows the so-called laws of association, which Bolzano reduces to the single rule that when we have regularly had two representations of a certain kind occur at the same time in our mind, the existence of one type of representation can awaken also a representation of the other type. The possibility to recollect has degrees, he notes and surmises it has something to do with the strength of the representations in question.

A special case of recollection Bolzano considers is such where one representation is supposed to refer to an object and we then generate another representation or image of this object (Bolzano also calls this image scheme, which is a term reminiscent of Kant’s philosophy). The image is often more determined than the original representation – for instance, when we imagine a triangle with a definite shape, when thinking of triangles in general – and we might have such an image even of things we cannot actually perceive (e.g. God) or even of completely imaginary things (say, when we think what a body limited by ten regular figures would look like).

Bolzano goes into great detail to discuss the use of representations as signs for other representations, which obviously leads to the formation of language, but he mostly suggests some simple definitions, so we can skip this part of his account. A more interesting digression is his suggestion that especially in case of complex representations formed in early childhood, we are not aware of their constituents. This is especially true, Bolzano thinks, with generic representations related to intuitions, like “red”, “blue”, “sweet”, “bitter” etc. These must be complex, he insists, because they are not intuitions, which always refer to just a single object (in other words, we have intuition of this particular red we sense now, but not of red in general), and also not simple concepts, since they do not have as clear limits (for instance, the line between red and orange is fuzzy). Indeed, Bolzano goes even so far as to deny that they can have intuitions as their constituents, since they do not have any reference to a specific moment in time (as my representation of e.g. my parents do). Instead, he suggests, these generic representations must be concepts of laws describing how certain types of intuitions can occur in our soul through interaction with other objects.

Bolzano ends his discussion of subjective representations with the rather obvious point that there are representations that we do not at the moment have and even never have had. Indeed, since intuitions are dependent on interaction with external objects, there are many objects we have never had interaction with and thus have never intuited.