Until now, Fichte has been studying perception, in which consciousness appears to be quite passive and to just receive sensations without any input of its own. Yet, he notes, this is not completely true, since even perceptions are, albeit unconsciously, constructed by the consciousness from parts of the flow of sensations. Even more of such unconscious activity is present in pattern recognition, which would be impossible, if the perceptions vanished at the same time as the original sensations. In such a case, consciousness would be blind in the fullness of its perceptions. Even mere indefinite repetition of the very same perceptions does not induce recognition, if the consciousness has no way to make a comparison that the same perception recurs.
Thus, Fichte concludes, possibility of perception and recognition presupposes not just receptivity, but also a capacity to preserve perceptions. Following Hegel, Fichte takes the opportunity to use the German word Erinnerung, which means simply memory, but where the phrase suggests that we are internalising something external. What is here internalised, he says, is not the sensation or impression as such, but the perception or Anschauung based on sensations: the patterns that we ourselves have unconsciously combined from the small elements of the flow of sensations. In internalisation we just consciously renew this activity, but without the sensuous elements. Thus, Fichte points out, these internalised perceptions are less vivid than perceptions as such, but the pattern – say, general contours of a tree – remains clearly in our mind. Indeed, he concludes, they are not anymore to be called perceptions, but representations (Vorstellung) or images (Bild).
Now, while this internalisation happens still somewhat blindly, we can do this same reproduction of perceptions also expressly and consciously. This, Fichte says, we call reminiscence and also memory (Gedächtnis), although the latter also means the unconscious possession of such preserved perceptions. The strength of memory varies, he notes, and is actually dependent on our own activity, as we can more easily recollect perceptions that we have actively attended to. Indeed, Fichte adds, the best way to memorise a difficult topic is to actively conceptualise, think it through and understand it, while meaningless series of e.g. numbers are very difficult to memorise.
Fichte notes that beyond recollection, the process of pattern recognition, in which current and past perceptions are compared and noted similar to one another, requires still something more. In other words, the two perceptions must be first related to a presupposed unity that works as a background for both, although it is not itself explicitly attended to as an object. This common background, Fichte insists, must then be their common subject or a self-perception or self-intuition of the consciousness. This self-perception is then something that is presupposed even at the level of perception, because through it we can distinguish ourselves from what we sense. Despite being something presupposed by every state of consciousness, it is something that we usually are not even conscious of. In this, Fichte suggests, this original self-perception is like consciousness of divinity, which our own lives presupposes, although we are rarely aware of it.
In addition to this self-perception, Fichte continues, internalisation still requires something more. As such, internalisation seems to require a previous perception that it then copies. Yet, he suggests, this copying is just a modification of a more general activity of producing representations. While internalisation and memory produces just images of previous perceptions, the same activity should be capable also of freely producing completely new representations, Fichte concludes. This new capacity or imagination is the next level in the process of consciousness.
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