Just like with judgements, Fichte starts by looking at such deductions at the barest level of consciousness possible. In other words, he looks at deductions that begin from a given contingent individual, find a property immediately observed as belonging to that individual and derive from this a further property, which is not directly given with the individual. Thus, he points out, an immediate type of deduction differs from an immediate type of judgement, which does not go beyond immediately given: “leaf is green” is a factual truth, at least for a while, but but deriving from this that the leaf is still living, because green leaves tend to be alive, extends our knowledge beyond experience. Due to the positive conclusion of the deduction, Fichte calls this a positive deduction.
Fichte at once notes that although a positive deduction has externally a correct form, it is internally faulty because of its contingency and arbitrariness. This means, firstly, that the middle term is related to the subject in an immediate positive judgement with all its faults, such that every affirmation is from another standpoint a negation. Furthermore, Fichte continues, the middle term is arbitrarily chosen or subjective and could be something else, and this contingent, modifiable and therefore thoroughly ambiguous middle term is just as arbitrarily connected to a new predicate, restricted only by an arbitrary personal choice. Thus, if I wanted to prove from the fact that it has rained that there will be good harvest, this might be true in some conditions, but not e.g. if the rain has made the soil too moist. More generally, Fichte says, an isolated detail does not reveal the big picture, where other details might modify the events. Fault in the immediate deduction is thus to take conditional as absolute and universal: form of deduction demands universality and necessity, but its content does not correspond to this.
The traditional Aristotelian syllogisms were divided into four figures, dependent on the position of the three terms in the deduction, and just like Hegel, Fichte considers these different figures at this most immediate level. Unlike Hegel, he ignores what in Aristotelian tradition was called the second figure, where for the middle term was taken the most universal term that worked as predicate for both the other terms: so, if in the first figure the terms were arranged as A (minor) – B (middle term) – C (major), in the second they would have been arranged as A–C–B or as B–C–A (the order of the other terms doesn’t matter here). An example of such a deduction would be: butterflies fly, wingless animals cannot fly, thus, butterflies are not wingless animals (the conclusion is here always negative). Fichte explains his choice by noting that the negative conclusion could always be turned into a positive judgement (e.g. butterfly has wings), and so the second figure does not present anything new.
Instead, Fichte tries to find the next type or figure of deduction by looking at what is lacking in the first type. Here the fault lies, Fichte thinks, not in the relation of the minor and the middle terms, because this should be based on an actual, even if contingent connection (for instance, we see that it is actually raining now). Thus, it must lie in the relation of the middle term to the major (it is based on many other conditions whether rain makes the soil fruitful). This relation must then be proven, and since we now are checking only the three terms in question, the connection must be based on the minor: the two general predicates must be connected by an individual, immediate fact (rain makes soil fruitful, because in this particular case or these particular cases of rain it does so).
This new type of deduction is roughly what Aristotelians called the third figure of syllogism, where the terms would be arranged as B–A–C or as C–A–B (again, the order of the other terms doesn’t matter here). As is apparent, its conclusion might not be universally valid, but perhaps only in particular cases: thus, Fichte calls it a particular deduction. This is just as it should be, Fichte assures us, because the point of this deduction is to bring explicitly forward the contingency and arbitrariness of the first type of deduction.
Aristotelians spoke also of a fourth kind of figure of syllogism, where the terms would be arranged in the reverse form from the first figure, that is, as C–B–A. Fichte thinks that this must be the next development from the particular deduction, because we can get to it from the particular deduction by taking one of its extremes and placing it instead as the middle term of the other two terms. The result is what Fichte calls a negative particular deduction, since its conclusion must always be negative particular judgement: for instance, if lifting heavy weights is not a thing that poor athletes can do and at least some students are poor athletes, then some students are not able to lift heavy weights. Fichte notes that this is thus far the most intricate form of deduction, but also the most emptiest, since just like infinite judgements, it doesn’t really tell us anything. It is thus most useful as a symbol for not being satisfied with deductions based on nothing more substantial than mere contingent and arbitrary facts.
The problem with the first forms of deduction was that the middle terms used were just contingent properties. Just like in judgements, Fichte says, progress comes from taking as a middle term a predicate that collects all the individuals under the same kind. The third term should then be a predicate that belongs essentially and universally to all members of this kind. The contingency of the earlier deductions is avoided, because the predicate is supposed to belong to all individuals, no matter how they are modified. An example of such a universal deduction, as Fichte calls it, would be: all green things look nice, this is one of those green things and therefore looks nice.
Problem in such a universal deduction is similar as in universal judgement, Fichte insists, since both try to confuse collection of all individuals with true conceptual universality. That is, we can never be sure whether the property we want to conclude truly holds for all or only some individuals of the same kind, that is, whether there are exceptions that we have not just experienced. We need thus a further justification for saying e.g. that all green things look nice. This justification can at first be only going through every individual, which Fichte calls induction.
In induction we then have again individuals as middle term, Fichte explains, but the set of individuals is now understood to exhaust all individuals of the same kind. Although the induction thus resembles the earlier, immediate forms of deduction, the allness of individuals raises it above the level of mere individual perceptions to real experience. Yet, it is still problematic, Fichte admits, because collecting all individuals of the same kind is an infinite, unending task. The only way to progress, he adds, is to leap over all these individuals by finding a universal already embodied in or represented by a single individual, which could then be used as a middle term of a new form of deduction or analogy.
Analogy is thus based, Fichte says, on an object that is individual, but also represents its whole kind. Thus, when we notice another individual of the same kind as the representative individual, we should be able to conclude that this new individual has all the same properties as the first one: because Venus is also a planet, it should also have denizens just like the only planet we can immediately experience, or Earth. The word “should” is here important, Fichte thinks, because it shows that the supposed conclusion is only problematic, since we cannot say how far the similarity of the two individuals goes. Still, according to Fichte, the analogy at least complements induction: while induction tries to derive knowledge of universals from knowledge of individuals, analogy attempts to derive knowledge of correspondence of some properties from known correspondence of other, more essential properties and thus, in a sense, particulars from universal.
Analogy is no real deduction, since its conclusion is only problematic. Still, Fichte thinks, it shows development over universal deduction, where the problematic nature of the conclusion is not even recognised, and over induction, where this problematic nature is shown only obscurely. In fact, Fichte underlines, analogy reveals the faultiness in the whole attempt to base universally valid conclusions on single or collection of individuals representing universals. The true line of progress, he insists, is to just leave behind these individuals, which induction is already trying to do, and jump straight to what is universal and eternal in them.
In the new form of deduction, Fichte says, the mediating middle term should be an a priori concept, which still has its concrete side, namely, individuals that are nothing else, but embodiments of this concept. Thus, instead of basing universal concept on a collection of individuals, Fichte highlights, the individuals should instead be based on this universal ground, which is their essential species (say, the triangles). The species also has essentially some universal characteristic (like a certain sum of the angles), which then is the characteristic of any individual embodying this species. Following his account of judgement, Fichte calls such a deduction categorical.
Now, categorical deduction, as based on a priori relations, should require no further justification, Fichte insists. Still, we should still be able to develop it, he continues, but only by complementing it. Although concrete individuals are expressed as mere embodiment of their universal species in a categorical deduction, they still retain some accidentality in the sense that it is arbitrary which individual we choose to use in a categorical deduction (in the example of a triangle, it doesn’t matter whether we are talking of acute-angled, right-angled or obtuse-angled triangle).
Consciousness of this contingency is highlighted, Fichte suggests, in a hypothetical deduction of the form: if A is, then B is, A is and therefore B is also. Here, Fichte states, the first, hypothetical judgement expresses an ideal, a priori relation between two concepts, but does not yet state anything about what actually is. This contingent fact of actuality is then discovered – A is – and now this previously ideal relation is actualised, Fichte notes, and we see that this a priori ideal law rules the contingent actuality, since the existence of B follows from the existence of A. Thus, hypothetical deduction explicitly separates the concepts from the actuality and shows how the latter is subservient to the former.
Another need of complementation in the categorical deduction, Fichte continues, lies in that this form of deduction shows only one way to embody the concept and the necessary interactions of these embodiments. This internal richness is also lacking in hypothetical deduction, he thinks, but it is shown in disjunctive deduction, where we see concept or species divided into its subspecies. Furthermore, these subspecies or subconcepts are necessarily related in the sense that where one is actualised, the other is not: A is either B or C, but it is now B, so it is not C. Concept is here, according to Fichte, not just a ruler over actuality, but also contains an internal richness of possibilities, of which anyone can be actualised.
Fichte goes on a long digression, where he notes that we are now in a position to deduce categories – a favourite pastime of German philosophers since Kant. Fichte emphasises that his method of deduction is essentially to follow the development of consciousness thus far and point out categories as abstractions of important turning points in it. Fichte speaks explicitly of the development of whole consciousness, including even perception as having its own categories, although categories were usually understood as forms of thinking: his justification is that perception is just an unconscious and undeveloped form of thinking. He also points out that at this moment the categories hold merely of our self-consciousness, since that is literally the only thing we have been studying. The question about applying categories beyond our subjective consciousness is left later, and as he will thus go on deducing categories in a different setting and in more detail, we can skip this digression for now.
What is still left to do, Fichte notes, is to state that we have now reached the high point in the development of both deduction and thinking. What the last types of deduction and especially the disjunctive deduction should reveal, in Fichte's opinion, is the power of universal over contingent individuals. This universal is not anymore an abstraction, but is now what Fichte earlier called an idea: a stable essence that is embodied in concrete individuals and rules over them, so that these individuals seem not anymore independent.
Now, up to this point, Fichte continues, we have regarded thinking as only a formal activity, with no natural content assigned to it. This might make us assume that content is something externally added to thinking. Yet, Fichte at once adds, consciousness does have content, starting from perceptions, which it then has developed into concepts, judgements and deductions. It is still indifferent what particular characteristics this content now has, but it is definitely not anything outside consciousness, and indeed, Fichte emphasises, only this forming of its own content makes consciousness, perceiving and thinking actual. Such thinking filled with its own content or knowledge is the topic of the next chapter.
In induction we then have again individuals as middle term, Fichte explains, but the set of individuals is now understood to exhaust all individuals of the same kind. Although the induction thus resembles the earlier, immediate forms of deduction, the allness of individuals raises it above the level of mere individual perceptions to real experience. Yet, it is still problematic, Fichte admits, because collecting all individuals of the same kind is an infinite, unending task. The only way to progress, he adds, is to leap over all these individuals by finding a universal already embodied in or represented by a single individual, which could then be used as a middle term of a new form of deduction or analogy.
Analogy is thus based, Fichte says, on an object that is individual, but also represents its whole kind. Thus, when we notice another individual of the same kind as the representative individual, we should be able to conclude that this new individual has all the same properties as the first one: because Venus is also a planet, it should also have denizens just like the only planet we can immediately experience, or Earth. The word “should” is here important, Fichte thinks, because it shows that the supposed conclusion is only problematic, since we cannot say how far the similarity of the two individuals goes. Still, according to Fichte, the analogy at least complements induction: while induction tries to derive knowledge of universals from knowledge of individuals, analogy attempts to derive knowledge of correspondence of some properties from known correspondence of other, more essential properties and thus, in a sense, particulars from universal.
Analogy is no real deduction, since its conclusion is only problematic. Still, Fichte thinks, it shows development over universal deduction, where the problematic nature of the conclusion is not even recognised, and over induction, where this problematic nature is shown only obscurely. In fact, Fichte underlines, analogy reveals the faultiness in the whole attempt to base universally valid conclusions on single or collection of individuals representing universals. The true line of progress, he insists, is to just leave behind these individuals, which induction is already trying to do, and jump straight to what is universal and eternal in them.
In the new form of deduction, Fichte says, the mediating middle term should be an a priori concept, which still has its concrete side, namely, individuals that are nothing else, but embodiments of this concept. Thus, instead of basing universal concept on a collection of individuals, Fichte highlights, the individuals should instead be based on this universal ground, which is their essential species (say, the triangles). The species also has essentially some universal characteristic (like a certain sum of the angles), which then is the characteristic of any individual embodying this species. Following his account of judgement, Fichte calls such a deduction categorical.
Now, categorical deduction, as based on a priori relations, should require no further justification, Fichte insists. Still, we should still be able to develop it, he continues, but only by complementing it. Although concrete individuals are expressed as mere embodiment of their universal species in a categorical deduction, they still retain some accidentality in the sense that it is arbitrary which individual we choose to use in a categorical deduction (in the example of a triangle, it doesn’t matter whether we are talking of acute-angled, right-angled or obtuse-angled triangle).
Consciousness of this contingency is highlighted, Fichte suggests, in a hypothetical deduction of the form: if A is, then B is, A is and therefore B is also. Here, Fichte states, the first, hypothetical judgement expresses an ideal, a priori relation between two concepts, but does not yet state anything about what actually is. This contingent fact of actuality is then discovered – A is – and now this previously ideal relation is actualised, Fichte notes, and we see that this a priori ideal law rules the contingent actuality, since the existence of B follows from the existence of A. Thus, hypothetical deduction explicitly separates the concepts from the actuality and shows how the latter is subservient to the former.
Another need of complementation in the categorical deduction, Fichte continues, lies in that this form of deduction shows only one way to embody the concept and the necessary interactions of these embodiments. This internal richness is also lacking in hypothetical deduction, he thinks, but it is shown in disjunctive deduction, where we see concept or species divided into its subspecies. Furthermore, these subspecies or subconcepts are necessarily related in the sense that where one is actualised, the other is not: A is either B or C, but it is now B, so it is not C. Concept is here, according to Fichte, not just a ruler over actuality, but also contains an internal richness of possibilities, of which anyone can be actualised.
Fichte goes on a long digression, where he notes that we are now in a position to deduce categories – a favourite pastime of German philosophers since Kant. Fichte emphasises that his method of deduction is essentially to follow the development of consciousness thus far and point out categories as abstractions of important turning points in it. Fichte speaks explicitly of the development of whole consciousness, including even perception as having its own categories, although categories were usually understood as forms of thinking: his justification is that perception is just an unconscious and undeveloped form of thinking. He also points out that at this moment the categories hold merely of our self-consciousness, since that is literally the only thing we have been studying. The question about applying categories beyond our subjective consciousness is left later, and as he will thus go on deducing categories in a different setting and in more detail, we can skip this digression for now.
What is still left to do, Fichte notes, is to state that we have now reached the high point in the development of both deduction and thinking. What the last types of deduction and especially the disjunctive deduction should reveal, in Fichte's opinion, is the power of universal over contingent individuals. This universal is not anymore an abstraction, but is now what Fichte earlier called an idea: a stable essence that is embodied in concrete individuals and rules over them, so that these individuals seem not anymore independent.
Now, up to this point, Fichte continues, we have regarded thinking as only a formal activity, with no natural content assigned to it. This might make us assume that content is something externally added to thinking. Yet, Fichte at once adds, consciousness does have content, starting from perceptions, which it then has developed into concepts, judgements and deductions. It is still indifferent what particular characteristics this content now has, but it is definitely not anything outside consciousness, and indeed, Fichte emphasises, only this forming of its own content makes consciousness, perceiving and thinking actual. Such thinking filled with its own content or knowledge is the topic of the next chapter.
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