Immanuel Hermann Fichte: Outline of a system of philosophy. First division: knowledge as self-knowledge – Memory

Until now, Fichte has been studying perception, in which consciousness appears to be quite passive and to just receive sensations without any input of its own. Yet, he notes, this is not completely true, since even perceptions are, albeit unconsciously, constructed by the consciousness from parts of the flow of sensations. Even more of such unconscious activity is present in pattern recognition, which would be impossible, if the perceptions vanished at the same time as the original sensations. In such a case, consciousness would be blind in the fullness of its perceptions. Even mere indefinite repetition of the very same perceptions does not induce recognition, if the consciousness has no way to make a comparison that the same perception recurs.

Thus, Fichte concludes, possibility of perception and recognition presupposes not just receptivity, but also a capacity to preserve perceptions. Following Hegel, Fichte takes the opportunity to use the German word Erinnerung, which means simply memory, but where the phrase suggests that we are internalising something external. What is here internalised, he says, is not the sensation or impression as such, but the perception or Anschauung based on sensations: the patterns that we ourselves have unconsciously combined from the small elements of the flow of sensations. In internalisation we just consciously renew this activity, but without the sensuous elements. Thus, Fichte points out, these internalised perceptions are less vivid than perceptions as such, but the pattern – say, general contours of a tree – remains clearly in our mind. Indeed, he concludes, they are not anymore to be called perceptions, but representations (Vorstellung) or images (Bild).

Now, while this internalisation happens still somewhat blindly, we can do this same reproduction of perceptions also expressly and consciously. This, Fichte says, we call reminiscence and also memory (Gedächtnis), although the latter also means the unconscious possession of such preserved perceptions. The strength of memory varies, he notes, and is actually dependent on our own activity, as we can more easily recollect perceptions that we have actively attended to. Indeed, Fichte adds, the best way to memorise a difficult topic is to actively conceptualise, think it through and understand it, while meaningless series of e.g. numbers are very difficult to memorise.

Fichte notes that beyond recollection, the process of pattern recognition, in which current and past perceptions are compared and noted similar to one another, requires still something more. In other words, the two perceptions must be first related to a presupposed unity that works as a background for both, although it is not itself explicitly attended to as an object. This common background, Fichte insists, must then be their common subject or a self-perception or self-intuition of the consciousness. This self-perception is then something that is presupposed even at the level of perception, because through it we can distinguish ourselves from what we sense. Despite being something presupposed by every state of consciousness, it is something that we usually are not even conscious of. In this, Fichte suggests, this original self-perception is like consciousness of divinity, which our own lives presupposes, although we are rarely aware of it.

In addition to this self-perception, Fichte continues, internalisation still requires something more. As such, internalisation seems to require a previous perception that it then copies. Yet, he suggests, this copying is just a modification of a more general activity of producing representations. While internalisation and memory produces just images of previous perceptions, the same activity should be capable also of freely producing completely new representations, Fichte concludes. This new capacity or imagination is the next level in the process of consciousness.

Étienne Bonnot de Condillac: Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines (1746)

Enlightenment thinker Condillac (1714 - 1780)

If one wanted to name one philosopher as the strongest influence on works of abbé Condillac, it would clearly be John Locke, which is shown well by Condillac's first book, which investigates the origin of human knowledge. Almost all other modern philosophers are discarded, because they have based their philosophies on abstract principles, which Condillac considers to be a completely topsy-turvy method, because such principles are usually the most difficult topic to master properly. Condillac makes especially fun of Christian Wolff's metaphysics: Wolff defines e.g. existence as a complement of possibility, although this statement tells us almost nothing about existence or possibility, and indeed, fails to note that existence is actually the more fundamental notion.

It is then no wonder that Condillac instead wants to begin with what we experience. Experience provides us with ideas, which we then can use as building material for further ideas (e.g. we can abstract the idea of horseness from ideas of individual horses, or we could combine idea of a headless body of a horse and idea of human head to form the idea of centaur). It is by analyzing the genesis of our ideas that we make them clearer and gain a better understanding of what we actually know, while of abstract principles and concepts we usually have only a very murky idea. This is all very Lockean, as is the division of ideas into simple (certain shade of green) and complex (green apple).

What Condillac develops more than Locke is the psychological framework of different mental capacities required for turning perceptions into knowledge and complete science. What is truly remarkable is Condillac's attempt to reduce all mental phenomena into nothing more than sensation and attention. It is undoubtedly to be expected that according to an empiricist sensation would be the origin or basis of knowledge, but it truly appears radical to say that sensation is almost all there is to human mind. Thus, we sense things and we can choose some object as the focus of our sensation, but we can also focus our attention on the fact that what we now sense is something that we have sensed earlier – this is just what memory is about and therefore, Condillac concludes, memory is just another form of sensation.

Now, I find this reduction of all mental faculties into sensation deeply problematic, because there could be organisms that sense, but still fail to have e,g. memory. Such an organism could, for instance, note the presence of a certain chemical, detrimental to its condition, in its environment and then react with a movement taking its backwards, away from the source of that chemical. There's no need for any memory, just an unpleasant feeling and an automated reaction to that feeling. The existence of such an organism would be even evolutionarily reasonable, because this capacity would greatly enhance the survival of such an organism.

Indeed, a capacity for memory appears to require something else – some way to storage features of past sensations. Of course, this requirement of memory storage seems more imminent in a materialistically grounded theory of consciousness. Condillac, in yet another move away from Locke, commits himself to a non-materialistic theory of soul, and for reasons that strikingly remind one of Wolffian psychology: self-consciousness just cannot be explained through a complex substance. It is probably more reasonable to suppose that to such an immaterial soul it is just a matter of directing your attention to view some sensation as resembling past sensations.

Yet another area in which Condillac goes beyond Locke's philosophy is the role of language, which Condillac admits is almost a necessity for more abstract ideas and required, for instance, in advancing mathematics beyond simple calculations. Condillac even provides the reader with a hypothetical history of forms of language, starting from what Condillac calls a language of action, by which he apparently means a language using natural gestures and cries for communicating one's thoughts and emotions to others.

It might be that Condillac understood the importance of language from the example of ”wolf kids” who had grown up outside human communities and learned language only later in their life – at least this is a topic Condillac was quite interested of. It might also be an inspiration for Condillac's main work, in which he experiments with the idea of a person born without all the senses and upbringing of an average Frenchman – but this is a topic I'll return to later.