Théodore Simon Jouffroy: Course of natural right – Theoretical views

After reviewing a number of alternative theories about goodness, Jouffroy is finally ready to share his own ideas about it and thus to give a firm foundation to the (unpublished )future course of natural law. He starts in a Kantian fashion, distinguishing the immutable form of moral judgements – the good in itself – from the particular matter or variable circumstances, to which this form is applied. This difference, Jouffroy explains, makes it possible that natural law is immutable, but still is a science where we can make progress: we can always find new circumstances, where we have to decide what is good in them.

Now, an important feature of good in the case of particular individuals is that the good in this question should be the end or purpose of these individuals, Jouffroy insists. He immediately adds that this is no tautology, since it gives us a method for determining in each particular case what is good. Different beings have different natures or they are organised differently, thus, Jouffroy concludes, they must have different ends, indicated by their natures.

Jouffroy argues that since all things have an end – as clear and evident truth as causality, he thinks – their sum must also have an end, which is determined by the ends of the individual beings. In other words, the universe has an order that is moving toward a unified end. This final end is the good in itself we have been looking for, Jouffroy insists. As free and intelligent beings, he adds, we can understand that the universe has such an end and we have the capacity to contribute to this end by fulfilling our own portion in this whole: thus, we are obligated to do so.

Jouffroy asks still further what makes this end of the universe good. He answers that really nothing outside it, because as a total good, beyond it there can be nothing more good. Thus, Jouffroy argues, this goodness must be absolute and based on something necessary, that is, God, who is the source of the goodness of the universe: in other words, God does not make goodness good, but goodness is as immutable as God’s own nature, and God merely makes the universe conform to this goodness. This relation to God, Jouffroy things, makes goodness sacred and connects natural law with religion.

Jouffroy admits that not all humans can understand this final ingredient of sacredness in the notion of good. Indeed, our very view of the final end of the universe is limited by our standpoint: we can know there must be such an end, but we cannot say in detail what this end is like. Yet, Jouffroy insists, we can at least know something about the end of things we know best, that is, human beings. He will not go through this end in detail – this would be the topic of the whole natural law – but merely gives a very summarised overview of it.

An important aspect of Jouffroy’s idea of the human end is that humans have been provided with means by which to strive for their end, even if they lacked the full understanding of morality. Thus, our natural instincts and self-interest are not necessarily in contradiction with our final end and even contribute toward it most of the time. We want to, for instance, know things and associate with other human beings, because knowledge and communities are parts of human destiny.

Jouffroy notes that we can clearly never fully realise our natural tendencies in this life, because, for example, absolute knowledge and harmonious society of all humans are something we haven’t been able to reach. He concludes that the end of humans must be found in another life, which in a very Kantian manner requires that we must live after our seeming deaths. The end of this life, Jouffroy thinks, is to develop our personality by providing obstacles that make us virtuous and worthy of happiness.

All free and intelligent beings or persons strive toward their end, hence, Jouffroy insists, we must respect them and let them fulfill their own destinies. Yet, he adds, there are beings that are not free nor intelligent, in other words, that are mere things. Such mere things cannot have obligations, because they lack the tools for fulfilling them. Even these things must have ends, Jouffroy thinks, but their end is fulfilled by God, who uses them as mere instruments. In Jouffroy’s opinion, we humans can also use them as instruments, without a fear of violating them, and if our end requires altering or even destroying them, we are allowed to do so (a pretext for killing animals).