We are getting closer to a point where Jouffroy should start describing his own theory about the nature of good. Thus, he explains, he will be quick in describing various attempts of giving a rationalist definition of what good is, since the proper measuring stone for these various theories is Jouffroy’s own notion of good.
Jouffroy begins with a British Enlightenment thinker, William Wollaston, who defined good as truth: we should act in accordance with truth, and for instance, breaking a contract is acting like it was never made. Jouffroy notes quickly that Wollaston’s definition is quite shallow: when we use arsenic to poison someone, we could be said to respect the truth that arsenic is poisonous, and while trying to use snow to warm oneself might be absurd, it certainly isn’t immoral.
Jouffroy is as quick with Samuel Clarke and Baron Montesquieu, who both defined good actions to be in conformity with the nature of things. With the exact same examples as with Wollaston, Jouffroy shows the absurdity of this definition: it is immoral, but in agreement with the nature of arsenic to use it for poisoning, and while it contradicts the nature of snow to use it for warming oneself, it certainly isn’t immoral to attempt doing it.
Jouffroy is more positive with the ideas of Nicholas Malebranche, who defined good in terms of the order of entities emanating from God: these emanations have different degrees of perfection, depending on how close to God they are, and loving things according to their perfection should make us closer to God and thus more perfect, earning more of the love of God for ourselves. Jouffroy thinks that Malebranche is close to truth, but his idea of perfection is too vague, making it too difficult to deduce exact duties from it. In effect, Jouffroy states, Malebranche was too much of a metaphysician and forgot humans when concentrating with God.
As for Christian Wolff, Jouffroy thinks his fault is the exact opposite from Malebranche, that is, Wolff wasn’t metaphysical enough. Like Malebranche, Wolff defined good through the notion of perfection, but Jouffroy finds it more lacking, since Wolff never explains why good is to be identified with perfection. Furthermore, Jouffroy continues, Wolff never gave a sufficient explanation what perfections meant in case of individual humans.
From Wolff, Jouffroy moves to his opponent, Christian Crusius. Against all Leibnizians, Crusius had emphasised God’s absolutely free will and defined good as what God wills. Jouffroy thinks that Crusius is not following the correct order, since not even divine will can make anything good. Otherwise, he insists, we could not have a clear criterion for recognising what is good.
Jouffroy is very quick with Richard Cumberland and Samuel Puffendorf. Both made the same mistake that they concentrated only on what is good in social relations of humans, ignoring the question of what is good for a human being in isolation from all other humans or what is good for a human in relation to God or to other non-human things. Jouffroy also disregards all systems that merely say that good is to e.g. follow the law of nature, since he considers such statements to be mere tautologies.
Jouffroy’s purpose for the whole book has been to discuss modern systems of ethics, ignoring all ethical theories of ancient philosophers. Yet, he makes an exception with Stoicism, for the simple reason that he considers Stoics to have been near to the truth about the matter.
The philosopher in the context of rationalist systems of ethics Jouffroy spends most time with is Immanuel Kant – he even goes through Kant’s ethics twice, just in somewhat different words, because he thinks it is important for his readers or listeners to have a clear understanding of Kan’t novel method. Jouffroy finds much to like with Kant, especially his criterion for deciding what to do and what not to do: true obligations must be such that every free and intelligent being in any circumstances could act accordingly. Despite this positive feedback, Jouffroy thinks Kant forgot the most important question of the whole of ethics, namely, what is good or what is the ultimate goal of human beings, leaving thus his own ethics incomplete.
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