The second volume of Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive starts with the topic of astronomy. The position of this science is not arbitrary, since he thinks it to be the highest of all natural sciences. True, it is preceded by mathematics, because astronomy depends on geometry and mechanics, but these are more like methodology in comparison, while astronomy is the first science dealing with concrete objects.
Comte sees the importance of astronomy in its being the most perfect science. True, he admits, astronomy has its practical uses, for instance, in determining longitudes, but its premier importance lies in its purity from all theological and metaphysical considerations. Indeed, Comte suggests, astronomy frees us from all teleological considerations, since it shows that Earth is just one among planets and not the centre of the universe, with humans as the end of everything,
As a science, Comte says, it is not just a collection of facts about positions of stars, but its task is to determine laws, through which to predict these positions. Indeed, he adds, astronomy has been the only science that has reduced all the phenomena it describes into one law: gravity. It is thus, in a sense, the least complex of all concrete sciences.
The simplicity of astronomy, Comte suggests, is seen also in the fact that it has the least amount of methods it can use. We cannot do any astronomical experiments nor can we really compare our observations to analogical cases in other circumstances (no space travel yet in Comte’s time). The only methods available are then direct observation of celestial phenomena and mathematical calculations. Indeed, Comte adds, astronomy even uses proportionally more calculations than observations, being the most mathematical of concrete sciences.
Comte insists that astronomy is independent of all other concrete sciences. He does admit that an astronomer must know something about physics and even chemistry for the sake of perfecting their instruments and for making necessary corrections for such matters like refraction of the light of celestial objects. Yet, Comte insists, astronomy is independent in the sense that we have and even cannot have any idea of the chemical or mineralogical constitution of the stars and planets or even of their temperature (all of this, of course, has been proven wrong, since we nowadays do speak about these matters).
On the other hand, Comte suggests, facts of all the other concrete sciences depend on facts of astronomy. Even sociology depends on astronomy, he insists, because even a slight variation on the orbit of Earth would change our societies enormously (considering that Comte insists that all concrete sciences should have some empirical basis, he does jump to this conclusion rather quickly).
Since all physical and chemical considerations are removed from astronomy, we are left with merely geometrical and mechanical properties of celestial bodies. Thus, Comte quite naturally divides astronomy into celestial geometry, studying forms and sizes of celestial objects, and celestial mechanics, studying their motions and forces.
In addition to these two disciplines, Comte suggests that we can also divide astronomy into solar astronomy, studying only our solar system, and sidereal astronomy, studying all celestial objects. He also adds that we should restrict our attention to solar astronomy, since other solar systems do not really affect us.
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