 |
| (1798-1857) |
Of course, there are clear signs of Comte being a child of his time, especially in his idea of the three stages of human thought: theological, metaphysical and positive. Similar notions of progressive stages of humanity, leading from crude religious thoughts to scientific outlook had been a staple of French thought. One need mention just Saint-Simon, whose work indeed had an influence on Comtee. Compared to the systems of his predecessors, who might have distinguished a dozen stages, Comte’s version seems much more streamlined, which shows his attempt to transform such crude historical schemes into a real law of human progression.
A more important novelty is Comte’s idea that the three stages are not really distinct, but more like abstractions from a concrete continuum. Thus, he notes that we really cannot determine a specific spot where e.g. the positive stage began, because it has progressed in different manners in different sciences, and while physical sciences have already managed to eradicate theological and metaphysical notions, they still abound in human sciences.
While it is quite easy to understand what Comte means by the theological stage, where everything is explained by actions of divinities, the notion of metaphysical stage is not so simple to understand. Metaphysics should supposedly replace gods with abstract forces that act as explanatory causes. This description could fit a number of theories, for instance, Neoplatonic hierarchies of abstractions, but when we see Comte suggesting that metaphysics ultimately strives toward unifying all these causes in the notion of Nature, it appears that he is especially referring to various materialist philosophies that try to explain phenomena through some ultimate group of material existents.
Now, an obvious question such historical schemes suggest is whether they are meant to be just a very general description of past events or whether they imply that such progression has been necessary. Comte at least seems to take the latter route. He states that the three stages can be found even in the development of individual human beings, at least in the sense that we all must begin as theologians, searching for purposeful actors behind everything we experience. Indeed, Comte says, at the dawn of humanity such behaviour was quite rational, since there simply was not enough information to tell how e.g. the stars moved.
Even if the beginning of human history is necessarily theological, it seems to require more justification to state that it is necessary to move from this stage toward the so-called positive stage. Comte does not delineate any argument for this stance, at least in the first chapter of his Course, but he appears to have the idea that when we gather more and more information about the phenomena around us, we firstly notice that we really cannot find the ultimate causes of them, and secondly, also notice that we actually need no such explanations. In other words, moving toward the positive stage means rejecting all theological assumptions, but not by assuming other, materialistic assumptions. Thus, the positive stage is one of agnosticism and skepticism about ultimate causes, that is, in it we merely describe the laws or regularities of phenomena, but do not try to explain them.
The final justification of this historical scheme should apparently be given in the science of human societies, the foundation of which is one task Comte sets for himself in the course. This scientific study of humanity should replace psychology of his times, which he thinks to be still filled with theological and metaphysical assumptions. Comte especially criticises the use of self-observation as a method of psychology. In physical sciences, he notes, we have already learned that human observation might fake us, suggesting e.g. sun to be a much smaller object than it actually is. Why should we assume that observation of our own actions would be more trustworthy?
The task of creating a social science is in Comte’s eyes intricately linked to a second task, that of forming a system out of all individual sciences. Only through social science, Comte says, can we recognise logic, that is, scientific methodology, and so it helps us to understand relations between all sciences. Comte notes that creation of such a system or hierarchy of sciences satisfies our need for unification, evident in the earlier replacement of polytheism with monotheism and of pluralism of forces with monistic Nature. Comte speculates that this unification has its limits and that we can probably never reduce laws of different sciences into one law. Still, he notes, there’s at least a homogenous method combining all sciences into a unity.
In addition to these two tasks, Comte suggests several benefits his undertaking might have. Firstly, delineating the relations between scientific disciplines might suggest fruitful interdisciplinary studies. Comte mentions as examples Cartesian application of algebra into geometry and recent studies in organic chemistry. Another benefit lies in the reorganisation of education, where mere literary studies could be replaced by a curriculum designed around the system of sciences and beginning with their general methodology.
The final benefit Comte suggests links his undertaking again to the contemporary discussions in French philosophy. He notes that theological and metaphysical thinkers had disputed about the best possible form of governance: it is likely that he is referring here, on the one hand, to Catholic conservatives siding with absolute monarchy, and on the other hand, various materialist leaning thinkers speaking for more republican or at least constitutional state. Comte appears to be suggesting that this debate cannot be solved through philosophical disputations, but only through scientific description of how human societies work and how they could be organised most effectively - a task for the social sciences.
