Although one would have assumed that celestial geometry concerns only such properties as the distance, figure and size of celestial objects, Comte defines these as only one class of phenomena in stellar geometry, namely, static phenomena. He spends considerable time explaining how astronomers can determine these static phenomena, that is, measure our distance from various stellar objects, recognise the figure of these objects, investigate their size and even note the density of their atmosphere. Comte also describes the history of attempts to determine the shape of the Earth, noting that even if there has always been room for making details more precise, this does not mean that the advance of science has been just replacing one error with another.
Comte is clearly more interested in the dynamic phenomena involving movement of celestial objects. He recounts in great detail the history of the discovery of Earth’s movement, both around its axis and around the Sun. What Comte finds philosophically interesting in this discovery is that it has forced us to abandon the theological idea of humans as the centre of the whole universe and also the teleological idea of planets moving for some purpose. This does not mean that astronomy has made the world meaningless, he soothes the reader, since through it we have found the lofty idea of humans as intelligences discovering the laws of the universe even from an insignificant vantage point.
A second important consequence of these discoveries is, Comte says, that we must distinguish the notions of world and universe. By world he means our region of universe, consisting of Earth and its nearby celestial objects – effectively, the Solar System. While people of earlier times could have thought that there is nothing beyond this world, modern astronomy must assume that the universe continues beyond our world, even if we cannot say anything certain about what happens beyond the confines of our world.
It is just to be expected that Comte still has much to say about the three laws of Kepler. He is especially keen to point out that Kepler had to overcome former mythological ideas, involving the notion of a circle as the perfect and thus the only suitable orbit for the supposedly divine stars. The great effect of these laws, Comte suggests, is that they allow us to make predictions about the orbits of planets, satellites and comets. Yet, he adds, even these laws are mere approximations of celestial mechanics – the topic of my next post.
maanantai 26. toukokuuta 2025
sunnuntai 18. toukokuuta 2025
Auguste Comte: Course of positive philosophy 2 (1835)
The second volume of Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive starts with the topic of astronomy. The position of this science is not arbitrary, since he thinks it to be the highest of all natural sciences. True, it is preceded by mathematics, because astronomy depends on geometry and mechanics, but these are more like methodology in comparison, while astronomy is the first science dealing with concrete objects.
Comte sees the importance of astronomy in its being the most perfect science. True, he admits, astronomy has its practical uses, for instance, in determining longitudes, but its premier importance lies in its purity from all theological and metaphysical considerations. Indeed, Comte suggests, astronomy frees us from all teleological considerations, since it shows that Earth is just one among planets and not the centre of the universe, with humans as the end of everything,
As a science, Comte says, it is not just a collection of facts about positions of stars, but its task is to determine laws, through which to predict these positions. Indeed, he adds, astronomy has been the only science that has reduced all the phenomena it describes into one law: gravity. It is thus, in a sense, the least complex of all concrete sciences.
The simplicity of astronomy, Comte suggests, is seen also in the fact that it has the least amount of methods it can use. We cannot do any astronomical experiments nor can we really compare our observations to analogical cases in other circumstances (no space travel yet in Comte’s time). The only methods available are then direct observation of celestial phenomena and mathematical calculations. Indeed, Comte adds, astronomy even uses proportionally more calculations than observations, being the most mathematical of concrete sciences.
Comte insists that astronomy is independent of all other concrete sciences. He does admit that an astronomer must know something about physics and even chemistry for the sake of perfecting their instruments and for making necessary corrections for such matters like refraction of the light of celestial objects. Yet, Comte insists, astronomy is independent in the sense that we have and even cannot have any idea of the chemical or mineralogical constitution of the stars and planets or even of their temperature (all of this, of course, has been proven wrong, since we nowadays do speak about these matters).
On the other hand, Comte suggests, facts of all the other concrete sciences depend on facts of astronomy. Even sociology depends on astronomy, he insists, because even a slight variation on the orbit of Earth would change our societies enormously (considering that Comte insists that all concrete sciences should have some empirical basis, he does jump to this conclusion rather quickly).
Since all physical and chemical considerations are removed from astronomy, we are left with merely geometrical and mechanical properties of celestial bodies. Thus, Comte quite naturally divides astronomy into celestial geometry, studying forms and sizes of celestial objects, and celestial mechanics, studying their motions and forces.
In addition to these two disciplines, Comte suggests that we can also divide astronomy into solar astronomy, studying only our solar system, and sidereal astronomy, studying all celestial objects. He also adds that we should restrict our attention to solar astronomy, since other solar systems do not really affect us.
Comte sees the importance of astronomy in its being the most perfect science. True, he admits, astronomy has its practical uses, for instance, in determining longitudes, but its premier importance lies in its purity from all theological and metaphysical considerations. Indeed, Comte suggests, astronomy frees us from all teleological considerations, since it shows that Earth is just one among planets and not the centre of the universe, with humans as the end of everything,
As a science, Comte says, it is not just a collection of facts about positions of stars, but its task is to determine laws, through which to predict these positions. Indeed, he adds, astronomy has been the only science that has reduced all the phenomena it describes into one law: gravity. It is thus, in a sense, the least complex of all concrete sciences.
The simplicity of astronomy, Comte suggests, is seen also in the fact that it has the least amount of methods it can use. We cannot do any astronomical experiments nor can we really compare our observations to analogical cases in other circumstances (no space travel yet in Comte’s time). The only methods available are then direct observation of celestial phenomena and mathematical calculations. Indeed, Comte adds, astronomy even uses proportionally more calculations than observations, being the most mathematical of concrete sciences.
Comte insists that astronomy is independent of all other concrete sciences. He does admit that an astronomer must know something about physics and even chemistry for the sake of perfecting their instruments and for making necessary corrections for such matters like refraction of the light of celestial objects. Yet, Comte insists, astronomy is independent in the sense that we have and even cannot have any idea of the chemical or mineralogical constitution of the stars and planets or even of their temperature (all of this, of course, has been proven wrong, since we nowadays do speak about these matters).
On the other hand, Comte suggests, facts of all the other concrete sciences depend on facts of astronomy. Even sociology depends on astronomy, he insists, because even a slight variation on the orbit of Earth would change our societies enormously (considering that Comte insists that all concrete sciences should have some empirical basis, he does jump to this conclusion rather quickly).
Since all physical and chemical considerations are removed from astronomy, we are left with merely geometrical and mechanical properties of celestial bodies. Thus, Comte quite naturally divides astronomy into celestial geometry, studying forms and sizes of celestial objects, and celestial mechanics, studying their motions and forces.
In addition to these two disciplines, Comte suggests that we can also divide astronomy into solar astronomy, studying only our solar system, and sidereal astronomy, studying all celestial objects. He also adds that we should restrict our attention to solar astronomy, since other solar systems do not really affect us.
tiistai 6. toukokuuta 2025
Théodore Simon Jouffroy: Course of natural right – Theoretical views
After reviewing a number of alternative theories about goodness, Jouffroy is finally ready to share his own ideas about it and thus to give a firm foundation to the (unpublished )future course of natural law. He starts in a Kantian fashion, distinguishing the immutable form of moral judgements – the good in itself – from the particular matter or variable circumstances, to which this form is applied. This difference, Jouffroy explains, makes it possible that natural law is immutable, but still is a science where we can make progress: we can always find new circumstances, where we have to decide what is good in them.
Now, an important feature of good in the case of particular individuals is that the good in this question should be the end or purpose of these individuals, Jouffroy insists. He immediately adds that this is no tautology, since it gives us a method for determining in each particular case what is good. Different beings have different natures or they are organised differently, thus, Jouffroy concludes, they must have different ends, indicated by their natures.
Jouffroy argues that since all things have an end – as clear and evident truth as causality, he thinks – their sum must also have an end, which is determined by the ends of the individual beings. In other words, the universe has an order that is moving toward a unified end. This final end is the good in itself we have been looking for, Jouffroy insists. As free and intelligent beings, he adds, we can understand that the universe has such an end and we have the capacity to contribute to this end by fulfilling our own portion in this whole: thus, we are obligated to do so.
Jouffroy asks still further what makes this end of the universe good. He answers that really nothing outside it, because as a total good, beyond it there can be nothing more good. Thus, Jouffroy argues, this goodness must be absolute and based on something necessary, that is, God, who is the source of the goodness of the universe: in other words, God does not make goodness good, but goodness is as immutable as God’s own nature, and God merely makes the universe conform to this goodness. This relation to God, Jouffroy things, makes goodness sacred and connects natural law with religion.
Jouffroy admits that not all humans can understand this final ingredient of sacredness in the notion of good. Indeed, our very view of the final end of the universe is limited by our standpoint: we can know there must be such an end, but we cannot say in detail what this end is like. Yet, Jouffroy insists, we can at least know something about the end of things we know best, that is, human beings. He will not go through this end in detail – this would be the topic of the whole natural law – but merely gives a very summarised overview of it.
An important aspect of Jouffroy’s idea of the human end is that humans have been provided with means by which to strive for their end, even if they lacked the full understanding of morality. Thus, our natural instincts and self-interest are not necessarily in contradiction with our final end and even contribute toward it most of the time. We want to, for instance, know things and associate with other human beings, because knowledge and communities are parts of human destiny.
Jouffroy notes that we can clearly never fully realise our natural tendencies in this life, because, for example, absolute knowledge and harmonious society of all humans are something we haven’t been able to reach. He concludes that the end of humans must be found in another life, which in a very Kantian manner requires that we must live after our seeming deaths. The end of this life, Jouffroy thinks, is to develop our personality by providing obstacles that make us virtuous and worthy of happiness.
Now, an important feature of good in the case of particular individuals is that the good in this question should be the end or purpose of these individuals, Jouffroy insists. He immediately adds that this is no tautology, since it gives us a method for determining in each particular case what is good. Different beings have different natures or they are organised differently, thus, Jouffroy concludes, they must have different ends, indicated by their natures.
Jouffroy argues that since all things have an end – as clear and evident truth as causality, he thinks – their sum must also have an end, which is determined by the ends of the individual beings. In other words, the universe has an order that is moving toward a unified end. This final end is the good in itself we have been looking for, Jouffroy insists. As free and intelligent beings, he adds, we can understand that the universe has such an end and we have the capacity to contribute to this end by fulfilling our own portion in this whole: thus, we are obligated to do so.
Jouffroy asks still further what makes this end of the universe good. He answers that really nothing outside it, because as a total good, beyond it there can be nothing more good. Thus, Jouffroy argues, this goodness must be absolute and based on something necessary, that is, God, who is the source of the goodness of the universe: in other words, God does not make goodness good, but goodness is as immutable as God’s own nature, and God merely makes the universe conform to this goodness. This relation to God, Jouffroy things, makes goodness sacred and connects natural law with religion.
Jouffroy admits that not all humans can understand this final ingredient of sacredness in the notion of good. Indeed, our very view of the final end of the universe is limited by our standpoint: we can know there must be such an end, but we cannot say in detail what this end is like. Yet, Jouffroy insists, we can at least know something about the end of things we know best, that is, human beings. He will not go through this end in detail – this would be the topic of the whole natural law – but merely gives a very summarised overview of it.
An important aspect of Jouffroy’s idea of the human end is that humans have been provided with means by which to strive for their end, even if they lacked the full understanding of morality. Thus, our natural instincts and self-interest are not necessarily in contradiction with our final end and even contribute toward it most of the time. We want to, for instance, know things and associate with other human beings, because knowledge and communities are parts of human destiny.
Jouffroy notes that we can clearly never fully realise our natural tendencies in this life, because, for example, absolute knowledge and harmonious society of all humans are something we haven’t been able to reach. He concludes that the end of humans must be found in another life, which in a very Kantian manner requires that we must live after our seeming deaths. The end of this life, Jouffroy thinks, is to develop our personality by providing obstacles that make us virtuous and worthy of happiness.
All free and intelligent beings or persons strive toward their end, hence, Jouffroy insists, we must respect them and let them fulfill their own destinies. Yet, he adds, there are beings that are not free nor intelligent, in other words, that are mere things. Such mere things cannot have obligations, because they lack the tools for fulfilling them. Even these things must have ends, Jouffroy thinks, but their end is fulfilled by God, who uses them as mere instruments. In Jouffroy’s opinion, we humans can also use them as instruments, without a fear of violating them, and if our end requires altering or even destroying them, we are allowed to do so (a pretext for killing animals).
perjantai 2. toukokuuta 2025
Théodore Simon Jouffroy: Course of natural right – Defining good
We are getting closer to a point where Jouffroy should start describing his own theory about the nature of good. Thus, he explains, he will be quick in describing various attempts of giving a rationalist definition of what good is, since the proper measuring stone for these various theories is Jouffroy’s own notion of good.
Jouffroy begins with a British Enlightenment thinker, William Wollaston, who defined good as truth: we should act in accordance with truth, and for instance, breaking a contract is acting like it was never made. Jouffroy notes quickly that Wollaston’s definition is quite shallow: when we use arsenic to poison someone, we could be said to respect the truth that arsenic is poisonous, and while trying to use snow to warm oneself might be absurd, it certainly isn’t immoral.
Jouffroy is as quick with Samuel Clarke and Baron Montesquieu, who both defined good actions to be in conformity with the nature of things. With the exact same examples as with Wollaston, Jouffroy shows the absurdity of this definition: it is immoral, but in agreement with the nature of arsenic to use it for poisoning, and while it contradicts the nature of snow to use it for warming oneself, it certainly isn’t immoral to attempt doing it.
Jouffroy is more positive with the ideas of Nicholas Malebranche, who defined good in terms of the order of entities emanating from God: these emanations have different degrees of perfection, depending on how close to God they are, and loving things according to their perfection should make us closer to God and thus more perfect, earning more of the love of God for ourselves. Jouffroy thinks that Malebranche is close to truth, but his idea of perfection is too vague, making it too difficult to deduce exact duties from it. In effect, Jouffroy states, Malebranche was too much of a metaphysician and forgot humans when concentrating with God.
As for Christian Wolff, Jouffroy thinks his fault is the exact opposite from Malebranche, that is, Wolff wasn’t metaphysical enough. Like Malebranche, Wolff defined good through the notion of perfection, but Jouffroy finds it more lacking, since Wolff never explains why good is to be identified with perfection. Furthermore, Jouffroy continues, Wolff never gave a sufficient explanation what perfections meant in case of individual humans.
From Wolff, Jouffroy moves to his opponent, Christian Crusius. Against all Leibnizians, Crusius had emphasised God’s absolutely free will and defined good as what God wills. Jouffroy thinks that Crusius is not following the correct order, since not even divine will can make anything good. Otherwise, he insists, we could not have a clear criterion for recognising what is good.
Jouffroy is very quick with Richard Cumberland and Samuel Puffendorf. Both made the same mistake that they concentrated only on what is good in social relations of humans, ignoring the question of what is good for a human being in isolation from all other humans or what is good for a human in relation to God or to other non-human things. Jouffroy also disregards all systems that merely say that good is to e.g. follow the law of nature, since he considers such statements to be mere tautologies.
Jouffroy’s purpose for the whole book has been to discuss modern systems of ethics, ignoring all ethical theories of ancient philosophers. Yet, he makes an exception with Stoicism, for the simple reason that he considers Stoics to have been near to the truth about the matter.
The philosopher in the context of rationalist systems of ethics Jouffroy spends most time with is Immanuel Kant – he even goes through Kant’s ethics twice, just in somewhat different words, because he thinks it is important for his readers or listeners to have a clear understanding of Kan’t novel method. Jouffroy finds much to like with Kant, especially his criterion for deciding what to do and what not to do: true obligations must be such that every free and intelligent being in any circumstances could act accordingly. Despite this positive feedback, Jouffroy thinks Kant forgot the most important question of the whole of ethics, namely, what is good or what is the ultimate goal of human beings, leaving thus his own ethics incomplete.
Jouffroy begins with a British Enlightenment thinker, William Wollaston, who defined good as truth: we should act in accordance with truth, and for instance, breaking a contract is acting like it was never made. Jouffroy notes quickly that Wollaston’s definition is quite shallow: when we use arsenic to poison someone, we could be said to respect the truth that arsenic is poisonous, and while trying to use snow to warm oneself might be absurd, it certainly isn’t immoral.
Jouffroy is as quick with Samuel Clarke and Baron Montesquieu, who both defined good actions to be in conformity with the nature of things. With the exact same examples as with Wollaston, Jouffroy shows the absurdity of this definition: it is immoral, but in agreement with the nature of arsenic to use it for poisoning, and while it contradicts the nature of snow to use it for warming oneself, it certainly isn’t immoral to attempt doing it.
Jouffroy is more positive with the ideas of Nicholas Malebranche, who defined good in terms of the order of entities emanating from God: these emanations have different degrees of perfection, depending on how close to God they are, and loving things according to their perfection should make us closer to God and thus more perfect, earning more of the love of God for ourselves. Jouffroy thinks that Malebranche is close to truth, but his idea of perfection is too vague, making it too difficult to deduce exact duties from it. In effect, Jouffroy states, Malebranche was too much of a metaphysician and forgot humans when concentrating with God.
As for Christian Wolff, Jouffroy thinks his fault is the exact opposite from Malebranche, that is, Wolff wasn’t metaphysical enough. Like Malebranche, Wolff defined good through the notion of perfection, but Jouffroy finds it more lacking, since Wolff never explains why good is to be identified with perfection. Furthermore, Jouffroy continues, Wolff never gave a sufficient explanation what perfections meant in case of individual humans.
From Wolff, Jouffroy moves to his opponent, Christian Crusius. Against all Leibnizians, Crusius had emphasised God’s absolutely free will and defined good as what God wills. Jouffroy thinks that Crusius is not following the correct order, since not even divine will can make anything good. Otherwise, he insists, we could not have a clear criterion for recognising what is good.
Jouffroy is very quick with Richard Cumberland and Samuel Puffendorf. Both made the same mistake that they concentrated only on what is good in social relations of humans, ignoring the question of what is good for a human being in isolation from all other humans or what is good for a human in relation to God or to other non-human things. Jouffroy also disregards all systems that merely say that good is to e.g. follow the law of nature, since he considers such statements to be mere tautologies.
Jouffroy’s purpose for the whole book has been to discuss modern systems of ethics, ignoring all ethical theories of ancient philosophers. Yet, he makes an exception with Stoicism, for the simple reason that he considers Stoics to have been near to the truth about the matter.
The philosopher in the context of rationalist systems of ethics Jouffroy spends most time with is Immanuel Kant – he even goes through Kant’s ethics twice, just in somewhat different words, because he thinks it is important for his readers or listeners to have a clear understanding of Kan’t novel method. Jouffroy finds much to like with Kant, especially his criterion for deciding what to do and what not to do: true obligations must be such that every free and intelligent being in any circumstances could act accordingly. Despite this positive feedback, Jouffroy thinks Kant forgot the most important question of the whole of ethics, namely, what is good or what is the ultimate goal of human beings, leaving thus his own ethics incomplete.
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