Systems Jouffroy has studied so far have denied the existence of obligations, because of considerations external to natural right. The rest of the systems he will investigate are more explicitly ethical systems, so that they either reject the existence of proper moral obligations because of ethical considerations or they misunderstand the nature of these obligations. Beginning from the first of the options, Jouffroy notes that such systems must reject proper moral motives and concentrate on one of the two other motives possible for humans: self-interest or primitive instinctual tendencies, that is, passions.
Jouffroy begins from the system emphasising self-interest as the only motive of human actions, calling it the system of egoism. As an example of this system, he first considers Hobbesian philosophy. Earlier Jouffrey considered Hobbes as an example of the system of necessity, because Hobbes denied the possibility of free will. Now Jouffrey concentrates on another aspect of Hobbesian philosophy, namely, the endorsement of well-being or happiness as the only possible motive of human action.
Jouffroy’s main argument against Hobbes is that in endorsing self-interested well-being he has ignored the other two motives of human action, that is, passions and moral obligations. Passions, Jouffroy explains, are not necessarily self-interested, since e.g. we might desire to know the most frivolous things, even if this is not in any way in our interest. Furthermore, he adds, we also acknowledge moral obligations that might be even against our own self-interest and even be detrimental to our very existence.
Jouffroy notes that even as a description of self-interest, Hobbesian philosophy is one-sided. True self-interest strives for our personal good, which might depend on ignoring some types of pleasures, although Hobbes does not recognise this. Furthermore, Jouffroy adds, some forms of pleasure are intrinsically connected with the good of others, such as those deriving from the passion of sympathy.
Jouffroy thinks he has crushed the very principles on which Hobbesian ethics and politics are based on. Still, he wants to go further and show how the more extensive Hobbesian system contradicts itself. Thus, Jouffroy points out that the Hobbesian idea of the state of nature, with every person waging war against others, is inconsistent, because no person would regard it as being in their self-interest to live in such a state. Furthermore, he adds, when Hobbes speaks of everyone having right to everything in this contradictory state of nature, this is a further inconsistency, since no one has a duty to honour such a right, and indeed, anyone can violate such a right.
As unacceptable as the Hobbesian idea of the state of nature, as unconvincing Joffrey finds the description of how people should move to a state of political community in the Hobbesian philosophy. Hobbes cannot explain, Jouffrey emphasises, why people would be obligated to start obeying a government, if they find this disagrees with their self-interest. Thus, the Hobbesian civil contract is something people could break at any moment, if they so wanted. The only glue left to hold the people together as one community is then force, Jouffrey concludes, which means that this is no true community.
Jouffroy lists other thinkers resembling Hobbes in their endorsement of self-interest, such as Larochefoucault and Helvetius. Yet, the only philosopher Jouffroys considers in more detail is Bentham, more so because of his fame than because of his originality. Jouffroy does admit that Benthamian calculus for deciding good legislation is an important invention, but notes that this invention concerns only legal affairs, not ethics.
Indeed, Jouffroy insists that Bentham is more of a jurist than a moralist. In ethics, Bentham does nothing else but state self-interest as the only possible motive of human action, but provides no argument for this statement. Jouffroy admits that all sciences must begin with some unproven axioms, but adds at once that Benthamian principle is not such an axiom, since it would require justification through experience.
Bentham does try to refute all the opposed systems, admitting different principles than his own. Jouffroy considers these refutations very insufficient. Firstly, Bentham recognises only two alternative theories of motives for human action. One of these Bentham calls an ascetical system, thinking that pain is to be always preferred over others. Jouffroy notes that this is a misunderstanding of what he has called mystical system, where pain and pleasure are seen as indifferent states, being both equally unsatisfying.
The only other system Bentham recognises is the so-called system of sympathy and antipathy. Jouffroy notes wryly that under this title Bentham categorises a very diverse number of systems. As for Benthamian strategy for refuting such systems, Jouffroy notes firstly that his own system recognises a motive very different from self-interest, namely, principle of order, since it motivates us to do what is good in itself, not just for us. In comparison, the Benthamian principle of self-interest regards only what is good for an individual and leads merely to anarchy of every person interested merely in their own benefit or then to a despotism of one person having the power to subdue the interests of others.
Jouffroy admits that Bentham tries to move from personal to general interest. Yet, Jouffroy adds, this move is based on nothing more than confusion of these two forms of interest. Indeed, if only personal pleasure and pain guide us, pain and pleasure of others are usually indifferent to us. Even if we suppose that we feel pleasure or sympathy for the well-being of others, we could still calculate that robbing them might still add to our overall private happiness.
Jouffroy states that Hobbes and Bentham exemplify only one form of egoism, because self-interest is a complex phenomenon with many aspects that egoists could emphasise. Thus, some people confuse self-interest with pleasure, being driven by what feels good, even against their own interests. Another confusion leads people to consider means for good results, such as money and fame, as the only motive of their own actions. Finally, some rational egoists might understand self-interest as doing what conforms with our own nature, which with weak minds, Jouffroy suggests, might lead even to excessive prudence.
Jouffroy suggests that some egoists might also emphasise pleasures received from more social and benevolent passions over more selfish desires. Although these egoists resemble true proponents of morality, he points out, they have very different motives for their seemingly good actions: thus, we have people spending money on others, because it makes them feel good, or acting virtuously, because it will have its rewards in the afterlife – or even just because they find unselfish action aesthetically pleasing. Compared to such egoists, Hobbes and Bentham are more honest, Jouffroy thinks, revealing what egoism is really about.
Jouffroy still mentions egoist systems that try to justify actions for general interest on the basis that these actions advance their own interests. Just like with Bentham, Jouffroy is not convinced of such an argument, because it still leaves the possibility that a person acts against general self-interest, if it is against their own interest. In fact, Jouffroy underlines, an egoist system can never be truly moral, even if some egoist systems may resemble proper morality, since egoism cannot prove the existence of any obligations. Indeed, an egoist cannot even argue why we should act for our own interest, but must assume that we instinctually do so.
Näytetään tekstit, joissa on tunniste Jeremy Bentham. Näytä kaikki tekstit
Näytetään tekstit, joissa on tunniste Jeremy Bentham. Näytä kaikki tekstit
tiistai 25. maaliskuuta 2025
keskiviikko 2. maaliskuuta 2016
Bentham: Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
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| Jeremy Bentham (1747-1832) |
Morals and
jurisprudence are quite a different thing, one might imagine, and
indeed, at least after Kant and his definite separation of the two,
this might well be true. Yet, one must not forget that Kant's division of these disciplines was rooted in a context, in which the
two were thought to be intimately connected. Before Kant, one might read books about
natural law, which was the ground and basis of both jurisprudence and
morals – natural law, ordained by God or reason or nature or all of
them, was an ideal that all civil laws should follow, even though
they might add some more laws to keep the wheels of civil society
running and even though natural law demanded things that no civil
authority had the power to control. Indeed, one might even think that
Kant himself did not distance himself too far from that context,
although he made a far sharper distinction between the two
disciplines than earlier philosophers.
Thus, it is no
wonder then that Bentham wants to introduce at common principle for
both morals and jurisprudence. The two disciplines just have
different fields of application, Bentham says. Juriprudence deals
with behaviour that civil society can control, but when behaviour
exceeds those limits, there's only morals to rely on. Bentham is
especially speaking of punishments, which was the original topic of
the book – if it would be too costly and difficult to apprehend all
people taking part in some behaviour conceived unacceptable, then at
least moralists can speak against it. Morals become then more like an
afterthought or a last minute resort, while the true interest of the
book lies in legislation.
Legislation, Bentham
says, consists usually of two parts. Well, he admits, there's also
the so-called constitution, but this is not clearly important for
Bentham. At best, constitution just states who are the people who
have the authority to enforce law. At worst, it is just a collection
of declarations, which appear to give unrestricted rights to people,
which the later law then restricts – people are born free, but then
law might demand restrictions on some people's liberties.
The mass of the law
consists of expository material and definitions required to
understand what the laws are all about – by copyright is meant this and
that. The core of the law then consists of imperatives – you should
follow the copyright – and for each imperative, there should be a
distinct punishment, Bentham says – if you impeach the copyright,
you shall be fined. The latter statement might be questioned, at
least on some definitions of punishments, because there are laws
denying something, but not assigning any punishments. Such laws
without punishments might still, for instance, give a law enforcer a
right to stop anyone from acting in some manner (cycling around with
a helmet is forbidden in such a sense in Finland).
The bulk of
Bentham's book consists then of divisions of possible ways of
misconduct, which might be forbidden by law. The basic method of
classification for Bentham is founded on the fact, who or what set of
persons bears the bad consequences of misconduct. Bentham suggests
four possibilities: the consequences might affect the person itself,
some other individual, some small set of people or the whole
community.
What is remarkable
in Bentham's division is the fact how little intentionality of the
actions bears on identifying something as misconduct. True, some form
of intentionality is a necessary condition for something being
punishable – a person who drops a stone on the head of a man
walking below accidentally or out of ignorance is not culpable. Yet,
even the inclusion of certain crimes in his classification shows that
intetionality is not a very central concern of Bentham's. For
instance, a person who eats and drinks too much might not have any
intention of hurting oneself, yet, Bentham considers that it still
forms an offence, because one ought to know better and see how bad
the consequences are.
A clear criterion
for taking some action as bad, for Bentham, is then the set of
consequences following from that action. Bentham is here going
especially against theories of natural law, in which good and bad
actions were decided more by their concordance with some law. Bentham
suggests that the real reason guiding these theories is just an
antipathy or sympathy one feels towards some actions – philosophers
speak about natural law, but actually just reveal their own likes and
dislikes. The same criticism appears to go against all deontological
theories, which take goodness and badness to be an intrinsic property
of actions, despite their consequences. Bentham's attitude appears
rather unfair – he doesn't understand what such a theory is all
about, thus, he concludes that it is just an arbitrary decision of
what is good or bad.
We might briefly
consider what Bentham would say to a virtue theory, which bases the
essence of ethics to individual's character instead of actions and
their consequences. Firstly, it is undoubtedly difficult to base a
system of jurisprudence on virtue theory (we don't usually punish
people, because of their characters), and as jurisprudence is far more
interesting topic to Bentham than ethics, he would have little motive
to entertain virtue theory. Furthermore, Bentham appears to think
that character is essentially just a fiction describing the tendency
of a person to act in certain manner, where the tendency is merely a
generalisation out of all past actions of a person.
Bentham is then a
devoted consequentialist, and he considers two species of it: either
one thinks pleasures are to be sought out and pleasures abandoned or
the other way around. The latter principle – the principle of
asceticism – is something Bentham ridicules a lot. It is an apparent
caricature of Stoic and Christian ideals – surely these two do not
aim for pain for its own sake, but for pleasures of a higher sort.
Bentham's preferred
theory is then utilitarianism – the worth of an action is decided
by the pleasure and the pain it engenders. One must say that there
are certain problems in this suggestion, especially when it is
applied to jurisprudence. Bentham appears to say that in
jurisprudence we should particularly look at the consequences of an
action for all citizens of a society. Now, among pleasures and pains
Bentham considers are such emotions like security and fear. If then
the majority will experience fear and anxiety over some plausible
consequences of person's actions, these actions are to be condemned
bad. Then again, if a person does not marry a person of another
gender and beget children – perhaps because she has vowed herself for
abstinence, or perhaps because she would instead want to marry
someone of the same gender – this will make the country weaker on
the long run, because not as many children are born as could be.
Bentham then concludes that sexual relationships incapable of
begetting children and even abstinence are both condemnable, even if
something where the actual punishment must be left for morals.
I find Bentham's
reasoning here somewhat questionable, since its result breaches
certain inalienable rights of human beings, namely, their right to
determine their own sexuality. Of course, Bentham has already said
law shouldn't recognise any inalienable rights, but all things should
be guided by the pleasure of the majority, without any concern for
the welfare of minorities. Admittedly, this is all quite in line with
Bentham's utilitarianism, but this just makes me question, whether
utilitarianism, at least in Bentham's style, is a proper principle of
either ethics or jurisprudence.
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