Moving on from astronomy or the study of the large objects of our Solar System, Comte arrives at the study of objects on the surface of one of these large objects, namely, Earth. Within this study, he notes, it is easy to distinguish between the study of inorganic and organic objects, but it is difficult to note what distinguishes the two major parts of the former, namely, physics and chemistry.
Comte notes, firstly, that physics studies properties general to all matter, while chemistry studies only interactions of particular substances. Thus, weight, temperature, electricity and even acoustic and optic properties concern all bodies, and while magnetism seems to be an exception, Comte points out that it has been shown to be a mere type of electrical phenomena.
A further point of distinction Comte states is that physics studies masses, while chemistry studies molecules. He admits that this distinction is not completely general, since weight is also a property of molecules, and indeed, most physical phenomena are a result of molecular interactions, with the possible exception of acoustics and electricity. A more apt distinction, Comte suggests, is that in chemistry at least one of the interacting substances must be in a state of extreme division and fluidity, while such a division would hinder physical processes.
The final characteristic differentiating physics from chemistry, according to Comte, is that while in the former the arrangement of molecules may change, the nature of molecules themselves does not, although this happens all the time in chemistry. He admits this distinction is not rigid, since physical changes can sometimes result in chemical changes, where the molecules themselves change their nature. Still, Comte insists, even if all chemical phenomena would eventually be reduced to physical processes, the structural difference between the two disciplines would remain.
Having thus defined physics, Comte notes that it must follow astronomy in the hierarchy of sciences, since it is much more complex than the latter: while astronomy studied its objects only through vision and investigated only their form and motion, in physics we use all our senses. The complexity means, he adds, that physics is less perfect as a science, but admits more routes of investigation.
Indeed, while in astronomy we could only observe celestial objects and their movements, Comte notes, physics uses beside observationa also experimentation and is in fact a prime example of latter, since in physical studies we have the most possibility to put bodies in different circumstances. He thinks that physics outdoes even chemistry in this, since the latter allows only artificial experiments, while in physics we can also do experiments with bodies in their natural conditions.
Physics is not just less general than astronomy, but also presupposes the results of the latter, Comte thinks. Thus, in order to do physical investigations, we need to take into account various properties of the Earth itself – its shape, size and weight, for example – all of which are determined by astronomy.
Through astronomy, physics is connected to mathematics, Comte points out, but it also itself uses mathematics in its investigations: not as much as astronomy, but more than any other science. Sometimes physical investigations involve pure mathematical analysis, like in the study of heat, while in other cases they involve geometry and mechanics, like in the study of reflection and refraction. Comte suggests that physics gives an empirical foundation to pure mathematical speculations, while mathematics gives a rational structure to physics, which would otherwise be just a random collection of facts.
As has already been suggested by Comte, physics is a general study of Earthly matter and thus precedes sciences like chemistry and study of life. Indeed, he insists, these investigations presuppose the study of matter in general, and for instance, even living beings must follow the laws of physics.
Comte admits that astronomy as the study of the world and the study of life and human beings have been philosophically more inspiring than the intervening sciences. Still, he thinks that physics has its own interest as the current battlefield between properly scientific and metaphysical and theological theories. Thus, while astronomy is better at giving predictions and thus showing that we need not make supernatural assumptions, physics, according to Comte, is better at showing the human power to manipulate phenomena and thus alleviate any theological fears of e.g. lightning.
An important aspect of this role of physics as a battlefield is, Comte says, the use of hypotheses in it. Generally, he explains, scientific laws must be discovered either inductively from phenomena or deductively from more general laws. Yet, due to complexity of the phenomena investigated, we often cannot do induction or deduction straightaway, but we must assume some hypothesis as a preliminary explanation. Still, Comte insists, we should do so only if in setting up such a hypothesis we also suppose that we can at some point properly prove it through induction or deduction.
Now, Comte notes, current physics has often leaped over these restrictions of hypotheses and made conjectures about e.g. special fluids or matters explaining heat, light or electricity. Such fluids do not really explain anything, Comte says, and they even lack the properties inherent in all real matter, like weight. Yet, such unfounded conjectures are normal for a science that is on the verge of transitioning away from metaphysics to proper science: he points out the example of Cartesian vortices as an example familiar from astronomy.
Before moving on to the concrete parts of physics, Comte suggests an ordering of these parts, although he at once admits that it is still somewhat arbitrary and only the best in the current state of scientific development. The premier part of physics, he insists, should be the most general and the closest to astronomy: this is the characteristic of barology or the study of weight, since weight is the most general property of all matter and connected with the universal gravity of astronomy. Similarly, Comte notes, the last part of physics should be the least general and the most connected with chemistry, in other words, electrology or the study of electricity and magnetism, which are intrinsically linked with chemical processes and occur only in very special circumstances. Between these two extremes he places thermology, acoustics and optics. Of these, Comte suggests, thermology or the study of heat is the most general, while acoustics are more general than optics.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti