Jouffroy considers skepticism a more prominent opponent of morality than all the systems he has considered thus far. One reason for this judgement is rather suspect: the Western mind is not as prone to mysticism and pantheism, Jouffroy thinks. The other reason is somewhat more credible: there is really only one way to be a pantheist, but there is an infinity of manners to be skeptic.
But how does skepticism then threaten morality? Simply put, Jouffroy suggests that since skepticism denies that we can know anything, it must also deny that we know how to separate right from wrong. If we cannot do that, he concludes, we cannot really have obligations.
As Jouffroy pointed out, skeptical arguments are plentiful, so he concentrates his attention only to the most prominent ones. He begins by noting that these arguments can target three things: the subject of knowledge or the intellect, the object of knowledge or the reality and the knowledge itself or our representations of the reality. Of these, Jouffroy thinks, the objections against the subject are the most dangerous – and some of them even unanswerable.
Jouffroy first presents an account of how we know things. He suggests that we have two sources of knowledge. First of these is the observation that acquires information on the portion of reality we are connected with, either externally, through senses, or internally, through consciousness. The second source is the reason that leads us to the universal principles, like causality and substance. These two sources, Jouffroy explains, are interconnected: the observation must at first produce its own elementary notions (such as perception of something existent), before the reason is awakened to discover its own notions (e.g. noting that what is perceived must have a cause), yet, the principles of reason must always be implicit in our observation (all perceptions whatsoever have a cause).
In addition to observation and reason, Jouffroy adds, our knowledge is based on two other faculties. First of these is reasoning, which derives further truths from results of observation and reason, either through induction or through deduction. The second faculty is memory that preserves all the notions acquired through observation and reasoning and thus makes the reasoning itself possible. Note that Jouffroy does not say that reason would require memory: because reason should always produce the same results, as long as something else is first given, memorising its results would be superfluous.
Jouffroy begins with the greatest objection against our faculties: we can not really prove their veracity, because such a proof would be based on the very faculties and would therefore be circular. He admits that this objection is truly unanswerable, but is still not very concerned about it, since it would work, no matter what our cognitive faculties would be. Even a divine intellect has no other proof for its veracity than unjustified reliance on itself. Thus, Jouffroy concludes, we can do no better than to have faith that our faculties are in principle reliable, and even skeptics actually do this in real life.
Once this major obstacle has been removed, no attack against our cognitive faculties is insurmountable. True, Jouffroy admits, our senses sometimes make faulty observations, and our memory and reasoning do fail us. Yet, he at once adds, all these problems do not cancel the fact that these faculties can work properly. Indeed, many philosophers and especially logicians have published works that aim to improve our use of these faculties and e.g. make reliable deductions and inductions.
One might note that Jouffroy does not list the reason among the faculties that can be at fault. Indeed, he suggests that due to its results being necessary and shared by all humans, reason can never make errors. True, Jouffroy admits, some philosophers have attacked various principles of reason (like Hume did with causality), but these attacks have been just academic and all humans really admit e.g. the validity of the notion of causality. At most some philosophers have had disagreements about the classification of rational principles, but this is just an academic struggle, Jouffroy thinks.
The only remaining weapon against our faculties that the skeptics has, Jouffroy says, is to say that passions and bodily changes can affect and thus disturb these faculties. He readily admits this, but again just points out that these are just known causes for making our faculties unreliable and that we have means to recognise and remove the effects of these abnormal conditions.
The skeptical attack on the objects of knowledge relies on the fact that the things we observe are ephemeral and variable and thus offer no reliable and lasting knowledge. Jouffroy answers this objection by pointing out that we are actually not interested in knowing these transient phenomena, but want to and can reach something permanent, namely, laws governing such phenomena. The question how we can find such hidden laws on basis of mere temporary appearances reduces again to the question of the reliability of our faculties, which Jouffroy thinks he has answered sufficiently.
Jouffroy considers two different objections against knowledge in general. First of them points out that our knowledge is ultimately incomplete, revealing only a small portion of reality. Jouffroy accepts this objection, but thinks it doesn’t really affect our capacity to know: even incomplete knowledge can be reliable, as long as we do not make any unwarranted leaps of induction from what we do know to what we do not yet know.
The second objection concerns the variety of opinions different cultures and even different people within the same culture have. Jouffroy notes that such a variety does not itself tell that any opinion could not be the truth or that the truth would be in principle unknowable. Furthermore, he points out that despite these diverse opinions, there are still many things humans agree upon. In addition, Jouffroy suggests that especially the diversity of opinions in different ages indicates just that human knowledge is constantly improving and becoming more and more reliable.
In addition to this rather academic skepticism, which can never really be endorsed by anyone else, but a scholar, Jouffroy recognises a skepticism of the masses that means nothing more than lack of faith due to ignorance of truth. Indeed, he names his own age one of those times, when such skepticism rules the world. Jouffroy suggests that introduction of this type of skepticism happens regularly: all religion has its faults, and when scholars find them and tell about them to a wider audience, faith in the old religion is gone, without any replacement.
Jouffroy thinks that this development began with the Reformation and that its first phase culminated with the Enlightenment, where Christianity was faced with scorching criticism. Jouffroy himself is not convinced with what was meant to replace the traditional faith – materialism and democracy – and suggests that there has already occurred a counterattack against these novelties. His own time, Jouffroy thinks, is then in an even more disarrayed state, where there is as yet no clear and shared criteria for good and bad.
The lack of consensus on morality has led, Jouffroy thinks, to a cult of individuality and anarchy, bolstered with a disdain toward everything ancient and contempt of reflection and historical study. In his opinion, people at large are weak of character and are enthused about novelties, like constant social and political revolutions, which fail to engage with the true problem of the era: the lack of faith. True solution, Jouffroy insists, would be religious, and political reformations can only succeed religious changes, just like it required the introduction of Christianity to cure the political corruption of the Roman state.
Jouffroy’s advice to his readers is that they should try to take a long view and raise themselves above the concerns of the present day: historical processes have their own cycles, and it took centuries to get from Socrates to the rise of the Christianity. Furthermore, he suggests that the readers should take the stance of the ancient Stoics, who searched for the criteria of morality and taught them to the populace at large. As a part of this enlightenment of the masses, Jouffroy thinks, an important task is to speak against unnecessary political revolutions that cannot really achieve anything before the constitution of a new faith.
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