Louis-Gabriel-Ambroise vicomte de Bonald: Philosophical demonstration of the constitutive principle of society (1830)

In his book Démonstration Philosophique du Principe Constitutif de la Société, one of the leading stars of French conservative school of philosophy, de Bonald, returns to questions of political philosophy. Still, he also has something to say in the introduction of the work about different philosophical schools, especially as they had appeared in contemporary France. In a previous book, Recherches philosophiques, de Bonald had distinguished two separate schools of philosophy - Platonists, who lean toward innate ideas as the source of knowledge and uphold spiritualism and theism, and Aristotelians, who lean toward sensations as the source of knowledge and uphold materialism and atheism.

Now, de Bonald, distinguishes also a third school, eclecticism, represented by thinkers such as Maine de Biran, who were not part of the empirical tradition of Condillac, but who also were not attached to the very Catholic inspired school of de Bonald. De Bonald’s quick judgement is that such thinkers are simply inconsistent and that there really are only two possible philosophical positions to choose from - and in the end, only Catholicism is actually true.

In the book itself, de Bonald attempts to give a new justification to his political theory. He begins with a very traditional account of family: family consists of three roles, father, mother and child. Family as such is always monogamous, de Bonald says, because polygamous family would mean just combining many families together under same father (note how de Bonald conveniently forgets the possibility of polyandry). He goes even so far as to suggest that serial monogamy, based on the possibility of divorce, is just polygamy in disguise, although here the different families succeed one another and do not overlap in time.

De Bonald’s idea of family is not just heteronormative, but also patriarchal, as he insists that all the power in the family should reside with the father. Power of the father is absolute and independent of the mother and the child and divides into two parts: power to judge what is good for the family and power to combat any obstacles against the good of the family. Despite the power of family being concentrated to the father, the purpose of the family, de Bonald notes, is to take care that human species will continue through its individuals and especially children.

Between the power of father and the service of children lies the role of mother, who works as a sort of minister for the father, de Bonald tells. In a remarkably insulting statement de Bonald reveals that mother as a mediating element of the family resembles both men and children - being servant to one and controlling the other - and could thus be called a manchild.

Families tend to reproduce and thus multiply, and the aim of a state, de Bonald states, is to guarantee the continual regeneration of family life, just like families guarantee the continual regeneration of human individuals. Thus, he concludes, states should be like big families. If states have grown from a single family, this happens quite naturally, de Bonald insists, by central power remaining always in the hereditary line of succession. Then again, even in a case where a group of unrelated individuals and families combine into a state, there is usually some heroic person who acts as the central node in bringing all together, de Bonald assures the reader. He is explicitly criticising the idea of a social contract made in a state of a nature, where a group of unorganised individuals could invent a political structure to guide them.

De Bonald’s ideal of a state is thus monarchic, as we know from his previous writings. Central power must always be unified, absolute and independent of everything else, he says and adds that a king should have the final authority in deciding the ownership of the land and soil of the state. Just like in an ideal formation of a state, the monarchy should be perpetuated through heredity.

An ideal state, de Bonald continues, shouldn’t be just a two-rung hierarchy, with nothing mediating between the monarch and the subjects, like in the Ottoman empire, the favourite example of despotism for early modern thinkers. Instead, de Bonald argues that like domestic society or family had to have a mediating position of woman, political society or state should have a mediating position of the nobility. Like woman in the family, de Bonald notes, nobility should share the nature of extremes, being subject to the monarch, but being also like little kings, having absolute authority in their own piece of land.

While it seems that there is no place for the opinion of the subjects to be heard in Bonaldian state, he does allow a position for them in the form of General Estates, although it has only a consultative role in the state affairs. De Bonald dilutes this concession by noting that, as was the tradition, one third of the Estates was to be filled by nobility, who represented the political society, while the second third of the Estates was then supposed to represent church or the religious society. In his earlier works, de Bonald had thought that the final or the Third Estate was superfluous to the proceedings, but he now finds a justification for their inclusion: they represent the domestic societies or the ordinary families.

Just like de Bonald preferred monogamous family over polygamous, he also prefers monocratic state over polycratic or democratic state. In a democracy, he insists, all social roles are confused, everyone being both a ruler and a subject at the same time. He is certain that democracy works only in small communities, like Swiss cantons, or then in such backward and almost savage countries like America.

Unlike with the case of family, de Bonald notes that there are various middle positions between the ideal monarchy and democracy. Main one of them is aristocracy, which de Bonald calls also acephalous or headless monarchy. This need of a central power, he notes, often forces aristocracies to elect a figurative monarch, which still lacks the status of absolute ruler, because of its dependency on the nobility. Another type of middle position is provided by English representative monarchy, which de Bonald interprets as an unstable combination of three states (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy), which can only work in such an isolated country.

We already mentioned that beside domestic and political societies de Bonald speaks also of religious society. The place of the monarch or father lies naturally with God, whom de Bonald assumes everyone should be aware of through innate ideas and who accounts for the preservation of the whole world. Analogically to the domestic and the political society, the natural form of religious society is monotheistic, while the respective perverted form is polytheism, which de Bonald calls either idolatry (in a natural state) or paganism (in an organised state).

The problem with forming religious society, de Bonald notes, is the mediation between God and humans, since the gulf between the two extremes is infinitely wide. This problem is especially strong with the question of sacrifice, de Bonald thinks. For him, sacrifice is an essential element in all societies and particularly for all mediators, who according to de Bonald should sacrifice themselves in order to pay for the care that the rulers provide for their subjects. Thus, de Bonald insists, nobles are meant to put their lives on stake for their country. In an even more drastic and patriarchal fashion, de Bonald thinks that women should yield their whole life to the service of their husbands.

In a religious society, the role of mediator has at first been in the hands of fathers of the families, who have shown their gratitude for God through sacrifices - de Bonald refers to the story of Abraham, who was willing to sacrifice even his own son for God, who then accepted animals as substitutes. When families combined into states, this role of mediators was taken up by a priestly class, who continued the tradition of animal sacrifices. Still, the gulf remained, and de Bonald concludes, it could be bridged only by someone partaking both of the nature of God and human and sacrificing himself for the whole humanity - here’s a justification for main tenets of Christianity.

De Bonald’s account of the role of sacrifice in religion makes God sound like a mafia boss demanding payment for his protection. Furthermore, like his account of family and state, his account of church or the earthly representative of God and his mediator is quite hierarchical, de Bonald practically endorsing Catholicism.

All attempts to reform Catholic church, de Bonald stated, inevitably lead the church toward the equivalent of democracy, where all individuals by themselves mediate their relation to divinity. Indeed, de Bonald notes, reformist churches often endorse the ideals of democracy and even allow divorce, which he thought to be just another name for polygamy, analogue of democracy in family life. Like with state, de Bonald admits there are various middle positions between Catholicism and full reformism, such as Orthodox, Anglican and Lutheran churches, which at least admit the need for a priest class, even if they do not submit under the authority of Catholic church.

Joseph de Maistre: Essay for the generating principle of political constitutions and other human institutions (1809)

1753-1821

A Savoyard philosopher and diplomat, Joseph de Maistre, is a perfect example of a counterrevolutionary thinker. In his Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques et des autres institutions humaines, De Maistre outright states that one really cannot create constitutions out of thin air and that anyone attempting to do so will ultimately fail. The primary reason for this supposed fact lies, according to de Maistre, in the general truth that no great things have had great beginnings – this truth is apparently confirmed by experience. Thus, great empires, like Rome, have had humble beginnings, and while there has been no legitimate vote for the first king of a monarchic family, such dynasties have shown their legitimacy by their endurance.

De Maistre links the generation of constitutions with the generation of names. All constitutions involve names of, for instance, government officials with certain duties and powers. In a constitution created by a conscious choice, such names tend to be pompous and ultimately sound quite ridiculous, de Maistre suggests. In a naturally created constitution, on the other hand, the etymology of the names belies the humble origin of these offices – name has grown to its purpose. Then again, de Maistre warns us of confusing names with writing. True constitutions always have important practices that have not been written anywhere – a monarch cannot willy-nilly sentence people to death, but this has not been inscribed in any written document. Written constitutions can at best describe the living practices of a nation, although even such solidification of habits is often detrimental to the welfare of state.

One might object that endurance by itself is no criterion for the goodness of constitution – a state that has the power to maintain its authority might not be a happy one for its subjects. Yet, de Maistre is saying precisely that no popular vote could decide whether a state or indeed any social institution is good. The endurance of an institution, on the other hand, is for him a sign that it has developed through a divine plan, which works sometimes against particular human wishes. Human beings have no right to make constitutions for themselves, since God knows the requirements of human beings better, and especially in case of large countries, monarchies fare better than republics. Humans lack even the right to name the important offices of a state – Adam had the right to give names to things, but this right was forfeited after the Fall.

It is then no wonder that de Maistre sees religion as an essential element of a good state – the most religious states have endured longest, de Maistre suggests. Indeed, religion is for de Maistre the true source of civilization. He is eager to point out that while secular states have merely subjugated American natives, missionaries have been instrumental in turning them into productive citizens. And just like constitutions should be based on tradition, similarly de Maistre thinks that a true religion is always founded of tradition, instead of basing it on some arbitrary declaration of principles – the only such declaration that has lasted is Ten Commandments, which was of divine origin. And it goes without saying that such catholic religion must be ruled by a single person, because it has even more subjects than any secular state.

One must wonder why then France as such a state based on catholic Christianity could have fallen. Here de Maistre makes some speculations concerning philosophy of history. He assumes that great evil can only appear amidst great goodness – and great evil apparently means, in addition to general immorality, especially anti-clerical philosophy. While Greek polytheism was not a great religion, its Epicurean criticism was also of no consequence. Then again, the greatest catholic country ever also had the bitterest rivals of the true source of civilization, namely, the Enlightenment philosophers. Together with the general depravity of manners, de Maistre concludes, Enlightenment was enough to plunge France into chaos.

De Maistre’s conclusions are truly quite in line with his principles, but it is just his principles that we might question. Even if we admitted that God controls the human history and the development of constitutions, we might well ask why these sudden revolutions were not also part of the divine plan. De Maistre does rely on certain general truths, which he supposedly can justify empirically, such as the meager beginning of all great things. One can contest such justification and ask whether de Maistre’s generalization really works, but one can also assume that divinity is not restricted by such empirical generalisations – surely God can bend the rules he himself has set out for history.